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CHAPTER II

LEGAL STRATEGY IN
DEFENSIVE ECONOMIC WARFARE
THE SUGAR ENCOUNTER
INTRODUCTION
The "Sugar Encounter" between the United States and Castro
Cuba was a step in a progression ~f events leading to naval participation in such transactions as the Cuban Quarantine of 1962 and
the Cuban land blockade of the Guantanamo Naval Base. As with
most forms of economic warfare, the "Sugar Encounter~' evolved
towards mutual political postures in which naval sea and air power
became logical instruments of coercive economic policy.
But apart from this demonstration from subsequent events of
the need for an understanding by naval participants in economic
warfare of prior economic warfare postures, the "Sugar Encounter"
demonstrated dramatically, if not for the first time, the economic
warfare potential of the Soviet and Sino Communist Blocs, acting
singly or in unison, and the kinds of defensive legal problems the
United States would have to solve to meet this emerging economic
warfare threat.
In the "Sugar Encounter," the United States attempted to meet
an "economic. sortie" mounted by Castro Cuba by manipulating the
Cuban sugar imports permitted into the United States and by
supplementary measures in the form of "protracted harassment."
This Cuban economic sortie was mounted to divide opinion in the
United States and prevent decisive action as communization of the
Cuban state became increasingly apparent.
As a delaying tactic, this economic sortie was effective. The
United States defensive measures proved comparatively fruitless.
The description of the evolution of this defensive sugar policy in
this Chapter serves to develop three features without which contemporary international la'v concerning economic warfare and
legal strategy as a feature of economic warfare policy cannot be
fully understood.
The first feature is the posture of the monolithic state trader,
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particularly the Communist monolithic state trader, and the impact
of this economic institution upon economic warfare and upon
international law.
The second feature is the national law of the United States bearing upon economic warfare and the major problems in its administration. No international legal pr~blems concerning economic
warfare can be fully understood by naval officers unless relevant
national law is first appreciated.
The third feature is the continuing chain of economic coercion
and the ways in which this chain is affected by community intervention. The Chapter thus considers not only the "Sugar Encounter"
as such, but also major economic measures put into operation upon
initial failure of the United States defensive manipulation of the
sugar quota. The interests affected by this complicated process were
varied, and a naval officer in conducting economic warfare must
become accustomed to identifying interests affected by his action
and how the parties interested are likely to respond.
The materials in the Chapter are essentially descriptive. They
provide the basis for a detailed analysis of both national and international legal problems in Part II of this book.

A. THE MONOLITHIC STATE TRADER IN ECONOMIC
WARFARE
Within the past fifty years there has been an increased emphasis
upon elements of timing and speed in executing economic warfare plans and a similar increased emphasis upon the need for
accurate aim and careful direction of offensive economic action.
If offensive economic action is aimed accurately, directed carefully,
executed decisively and s·wiftly, and terminated when the desired
psychical effect is achieved, by-products of possible disadvantage to
the sponsoring state are likely to be avoided. The increased emphasis
upon these elements results partly from the presence of the monolithic state trader in commercial channels.

1. Competitive Advantages and Disadvantages of the Monolithic
State Trader in Economic Warfare
The foreign trade of the Soviet Union was one of the first private
enterprises nationalized after the Revolution of 1917. The internal
economy of the Soviet Union is now centrally and rigidly controlled. Its controlled economy has been substantially duplicated
in the satellites, and by Red China; and ·while the efficiencies of the
Bloc systems, the details of their organization, and the capacities
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of the various Bloc states to engage in economic warfare differ, the
advantages and disadvantages of the monolithic state-trading system
are the same for all Bloc states.
Centralized control of domestic processes for distributing consumer goods tends to instill "use discipline" in the population. A
low standard of living is either un\vittingly accepted or grudgingly
tolerated. Supplies required for domestic consumption are thus low
and limited in variety. Imports are less, depending upon the
efficiency of the local productive processes, than they would be if
there was no "use discipline" or a higher standard of living.
"Surpluses" can be generated to be marketed or donated abroad
to support foreign policies. The Soviet Union, for example, despite
the agricultural dislocation of "\Vorld War II, could export 400,000
tons of wheat to France in 1946.
Manufactured goods available for export are likely to be for
industrial rather than for consumer use. This tends to concentrate
Bloc markets in areas with a lo\v consumer demand. Bloc products
cannot compete effectively with Free World consumer goods in
higher consumer demand areas. To the extent consumer demand can
be stimulated in low demand areas, local resources channeled into
Bloc trade can be progressively restricted.
Labor unrest, actual or potential, is a source of weakness even in
a heavily policed Bloc community. Bloc populations, already on
a low standard of living, are especially sensitive to disturbances in
their food supply, either by interfering with their agricultural
production or by blocking imports of food.
As there are no major private entrepreneurs to protect, tariffs,
quotas and exchange controls to limit the flow of imports are
unnecessary, and this places the State Trader in a desirable bargaining position with "free-enterprise" states. A Bloc state may import
foreign products in excess of local needs simply to develop a foreign
market for future political leverage. Purchases, clearly in excess of
Soviet or satellite needs, have been made of cocoa from Ghana,
cotton from Egypt and the Sudan and rubber from Cey Ion.
The absence of a "profit concepf' in the "free-enterprise" Sense
also has advantages for the Bloc state. While the quality of industrial goods has been lo\v in many instances, prices and credit
terms offered, together \vith opportunities for barter, have tempted
countries \vith low reserves of convertible foreign exchange. Italian
firms selling chemicals and synthetic fibers to the Soviet Union
have accepted oil, cotton and coal in payment. To the extent that
Bloc trade presents a competitive threat in a Free World country,
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it is difficult to deal 'vith Bloc competition with laws keyed to
profit concepts. In the words of Samuel Pisar: 1
* * * Western antidumping la,vs * * * cannot adequately
cope with the possibility of Communist dumping or underselling. For example, there is no effective "\vay of determining the
'fair value' of Communist products under the present terms of
our Antidumping Act as amended in 1958.2 'Foreign Market
Value' is a useless criterion because there is no free home market
in a Communist country. 'Constructed value' is equally useless
because Co1nmunist cost of production is an outlandish notion
which has no relation to normal Western cost accounting or pricing principles. * * *
A..'?oviet Trade Control StructMre

But by far the most important basis of competitive advantage
in economic "\varfare of the Bloc state is the governmental structure
of trade control. This stands as a barrier to economic attack by the
traditional forms of "protracted" economic harassment and provides
machinery for incisive economic warfare direction.
The foreign trade of the Soviet Union is coordinated by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Minister is a member of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. Four geographic divisions within the
Ministry, two concerned 'vith Bloc and two concerned with nonBloc countries, deal 'vith trade on a country-by-country basis. Other
divisions within the Ministry deal 'vith particular types of goods
and with particular functions, such as finance, law, transport and
personnel.
Trading is done by 25 government owned corporations. Some
specialize in trade in particular items. Others specialize in trade
'vith particular areas. The corporate organizations differ depending
upon the conditions under 'vhich they work. AMTORG, the corporation specializing in trade 'vith the United States, is a New
York commercial corporation, O"\vned by the Bank for Foreign
Trade in Moscow.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is represented abroad by trade
delegations. The members of these, unlike the officers of the corporations, such as A~fTORG, belong to the embassy staff and enjoy
diplomatic immunity. The trade delegations collect economic intel1 Pisar, A New Look at Trade Policy Towards the Commu,n ist Bloc. (Material prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the .Joint
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Doc. 76695, 1961) 24-25.
2 Antidumping Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 11 (1921), 68 Stat. 1138 (1954), 72 Stat.
583 (1958), 19 U.S. Code 160 et seq.
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ligence and serve as agents for those trading corporations which
are not domesticated in the country 'vith which business is to be done.
I£ the country concerned does not have diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union, the functions o£ the trade delegation may
be performed by a special group. This may be headed by the
Minister o£ Foreign Trade i£ the political importance o£ the mission
justifies his participation.
Paralleling in some respects the functions o£ the Ministry o£
Foreign Trade is a state committee, GKES. This committee plans
foreign economic operations and supervises execution o£ these plans.
The Ministry o£ Foreign Trade, by contrast, is charged principally
'vith negotiation and completion o£ trade agreements.
Although little has been published concerning the control and
operations o£ GKES, the committee appears to provide the political
direction o£ trade o£ the Soviet Union and to coordinate Soviet trade
and Soviet aid. It has the characteristics o£ a highly placed economic warfare staff. Technicians installing an industrial plant or
furnishing advice as to its operation in an underdeveloped countryin short, the persons who would be channels for Soviet political
influence-are controlled by GKES rather than by the Ministry.
Economic activity o£ the satellites is coordinated by GKES
through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ( CEMA).
CEMA is concerned primarily 'vith intra-Bloc trade but deals also
'vith foreign trade o£ the satellites. It is a consultative committee
'vith a permanent conference o£ deputies, ·who meet weekly in
Moscow, a secretariat and a policy body made up o£ chairmen o£
the state planning commissions within the respective satellites.
Permanent working committees maintain liaison with the state
planning committees. CEMA provides a point at which marketing
information can be exchanged and satellite programs can be
developed to support Soviet political strategies.
The defensive capabilities o£ this system are impressive. Trade
conditions, like military and political plans, are a state secret. A
private corporation o£ a Free vVorld state, a convenient institution
for economic action in the past, must do its business in the Bloc
state through a government agency. It has no direct contact with
its market.
Commercial contracts are "canned." The contracts contain pro visions which are nonnegotiable and 'vhich must be accepted by the
Free World corporation in order to do business. For example, most
o£ the Soviet contracts stipulate for arbitration o£ disputes arising
concerning their terms before the Moscow Arbitration Court. The
inconvenience to the Soviet trading corporation o£ litigation in the
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state in which the private corporation is domiciled is thus substantially a voided. There is a remote chance, of course, that the dispute might be brought before an international tribunal. 3
The offensive capabilities of the Bloc state' trader are as imposing
as its capabilities for defense. The highly centralized trade and aid
organization probes unremittingly for points of legal weakness.
The Bloc trading policy is basically divisive. Bilateral trade
agreements are attempted, specialized to the country with which
the agreement is negotiated. ~Iultilateral trade agreements, which
might provide a foundation upon ·which Free World states could
confront the Bloc on a common basis, are avoided.
Bloc trade activity can thus be conducted flexibly and opportuniistically without the legal impediments which many Western states
have accepted in order to obtain reciprocal trade concessions. In
writing of the diffieulty in regulating trade relations with Communist countries, Mr. Pisar states: 4
The steady proliferation of bilateral agreements and barter
arrangements constitute an increasing obstacle to the assimilation of Communist trade into the multi-lateral framework of
world commerce. Existing arrangements such as GATT, the
International Monetary Fund, various trade associations and
commodity exchanges, as well as more specialized international
conventions (e.g., arbritration, patents, copyright), cannot in
general be expected to cope with the peculiar phenomenon of
Communist trade. Either Communist countries refuse to adhere
to such established 'gentlemen's agreements' or, if they do
adhere, their obligations assume a distorted meaning in the
context of a state-operated market.
A Soviet trading corporation can contact its buyers directly in
Free World states. It can circulate catalogs, stimulate demands,
take advantage of local patents and glean much economic intelligence.

Soviet Bloc Economic lVarfare Techniques
The Soviet Union began to implement its foreign policy by economic measures in 1923 as it recovered from the internal dislocation produced by revolutioR, famine and blockade. But no major
a Recourse to adjudication will depend upon the willingness of both the state
of domicile and the Soviet Union to participate. The corporation would have no
special status to appear as a litigant and would have to be represented by its
state of domicile or by some other state which might claim the right to extend
its protection.
4 l)"tsar. op cz"t ., 26 .

89
use of 'vealth as an offensive 'veapon 'vas made until after the death
of Stalin.
Having removed most of Eastern Europe and mainland China
from the aegis of 'Vestern political and economic influence, it
'vas Stalin's theory that denial of this market to the West 'vould
undermine the economies of Free World nations and stimulate an
internecine struggle among them for fragments of the remaining
1narket. Trade ,vith the West remained at the minimum necessary
to n1eet military and do1nestic requirements of the Soviet Bloc.
This "dual" or "parallel" 1narkets theory 'vas repudiated after
the death of Stalin. Trade and aid have since been combined to form
a cutting edge for the Soviet political 'vedge. Primacy is given
to one or the other as the characteristics of the political target
"'arrant. In almost every instance Bloc trade and aid have been
skillfully controlled and coordinated. 5
Bloc purchases in the West usually have been of raw materials,
such as rubber and fats, processed items, such as oils, synthetic
fibers, plastics and heavy chemicals; fabricated metals, such as
plates and sheets, structural shapes and tubing; machinery, such
as machine tools and electrical equipment; and major fabricated
devices such as tra,vlers and locomotives. Interest has been demonstrated in purchasing entire plants 'vith the technical information
to operate them. These purchases often involve performances by
t'vo or more corporations, some furnishing design and machinery
and others technical information and training necessary to operate
the plant.
Bloc strategy, as developed in the late 1950·s, combined conquest
by economic accretion 'vith the "economic sortie'~ as inviting points
of weakness in Free World nations appeared. The trading pattern
of the target area is gradually reoriented to,vards the Bloc by
increasing purchases of its products. These purchases usually are
The most recent comprehensive studies of Soviet economic warfare are
Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare (1960) and Allen, Communist Economic Warfare (1960) (Committee on Un-American Activities, H. R., 86th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Doc. 51038). Also suggested are Aubrey, Co-existence (1961) ; Berliner, Soviet
Economic Aid (1958) ; Benham, Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries
(1961) ; Knorr, Ruble Diplomacy (1956) ; Kovner, The Challenge of Coexistence
(1961) ; Mikesell and Wells, The Soviet Econ01nic Offensive (1959) ; 'l'he Threat
of Soviet Eco·n omic Policy (Department of State Publication 7234) (1961) ;
and Q.ommunist Economic Policy in the Less Developed Countries (Department
of State Publication 7020) (1960). Pisar, A New Look at Trade PolimJ Toward
the Communist Bloc (Sub-committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Doc. 76695, 1961) is a recent and useful
reference, although Mr. Pisar's emphasis upon economic warfare is subordinate
to broader considerations of trade policy.
5
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in dollars or other convertible currency to provide the initial attraction.
The Free World markets of the target area are restricted at the
same time by selling the purchased products at a lo"\v price to
customers of the target. Egyptian cotton, for example, has been
sold by satellites belo"\v the "\vorld market price.
As dependence upon Bloc trade in the target area increases, the
Bloc offers long-term credits at low-interest rates and shifts trade
to a barter basis. The use of credit probably stems from a desire to
shift to barter rather than from a design to force the debtor into
bankruptcy by insisting upon repayment at an awkward time. Yet
the credit has coercive possibilities for future action by the Bloc.
The size of the credit and its usual earmarking for "impact"
projects generates publicity and conspicuously labels the benefit,
such as an industrial plant or dam, as a contribution of the Bloc.
Administration of the credit provides an opportunity to establish
'vorking relationships "\vith key officials and influential organizations.
As ties of the target area with the Free World are weakened,
military assistance and grants in aid are commenced. Military assistance permits the introduction of large numbers of technicians,
infiltration of the policy making and security institutions of the
area, and neutralization or communization of influential governing
groups.
Economic penetration by the Bloc commenced with the aid program to Afghanistan in 1954. 'The program was extended to India,
the U AR, Indonesia, Iraq, Ethiopia and Guinea. Technicians were
provided for service in these countries and natives, both civilian
and military, were received in Bloc schools.
The Soviet Union, as of 1960, had extended credits or grants to
Free World or "Uncommitted Countries" of approximately $3.1
billion. The European satellites and Red China together had
extended credits or grants of slightly over $1.0 billion, the aid
extended by Red China being substantially larger than that of any
European satellite. Although the credits have not been utilized
fully, t"\venty-five Free World or "Uncommitted Countries" have
received economic assistance from the Bloc.
Bloc assistance may temporarily strengthen the economy of the
country aided. This strength may become permanent. The Bloc
program is too new to dra"\v hard and fast conclusions about it. But
the ultimate effects of Bloc aid and trade may be to disturb the
political stability of the area.
Industrial plants and public "\vorks have been particularly favored
as forms of Bloc aid. Public "\vorks, 'vith health and education
services, are usually the forms of assistance most needed by under-
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developed states to lay the foundation for political stability. But
premature industrialization of an underdeveloped state, lacking law
and conduct patterns not readily geared to the problems of an
industrialized society, may stimulate chaotic conditions in which
Communist political doctrines and institutions can obtain a secure
foothold. Such chaos, if it can be distinguished from the turbulence
usually associated with the creation of a new state, cannot at this
stage be said to have resulted from Bloc aid and trade. Nor has
the economic orientation of any Free World or "Uncommitted
Country," other than Cuba, been changed sufficiently to be used as
a base for Soviet political control.
Soviet tugs on the reins of states thought to have been "enveloped"
economically, such as Yugoslavia, Egypt and Albania, have not
produced the effects one might reasonably expect. The present danger
to the Free World is the divisive effect of Soviet Bloc economic
·warfare ·which stems from the high degree of flexibility and direction which Bloc economic policies have demonstrated.
Although the Bloc suffers from a disadvantageous disparity in
material resources, and has significant 'veaknesses of its o'vn, it has
the advantage of ability to concentrate its economic power at points
of ·weakness in the Free \Vorld. It also possesses organization which
permits rapidity in decision and execution of policies. The Bloc
is equipped to deliver economic sorties in addition to its slower
technique of capture by economic accretion.
The economic organization of the "free-enterprise" Free World, in
which the United States is the mobilizing force, is by contrast
keyed to a defensive policy in econo1nic warfare. The United
States policy, furthermore, is one of defense by protracted harassment of the opponent rather than of counterattack by "economic
sortie." As Secretary of State Rusk, with specific reference to
security controls, testified: 6
* * * While our policy of control is a selective one and while
we cannot expect to cripple Soviet Bloc economic or military
power through an export control system, we can accomplish
something useful if 've recognize that our objective must be a
limited one. That objective is to delay_ the development of
Soviet military capability in selected areas where a coordinated
denial policy by Western suppliers may have an impact. We
6

Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement
of the Export Control Act of 191,9, and Related Acts. (Hearings before Select

Committee on Export Control, House of Uepresentatives, U.S. Congress, Doc.
77836, 1962) 69.
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cannot hope to erect an absolute barrier to Soviet advancements
in military production; we can make it more difficult or more
time consuming for the Soviets to make certain kinds of progress. From this standpoint, the trade control operation is closely
akin to the basic objective of our national defense policiesnamely, the preservation and if possible the widening of the
margin of advantage in time wherever we enjoy it in military
capability. It is this margin in ultimate military power which
is the hope of the West in the near term, and whatever contribution the trade control system has made to its maintenance
is valuable. * * *
2. The United States and the Free World: The Legal Response to
Bloc Economic Warfare

The basic laws by which the flow of trade .between the United
States and foreign countries is controlled for political objectives are
the Export Control Act of 1949 7 and the Trading With the Enemy
Act of 1917.8 The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951
(Battle Act) 9 establishes the basis for the United States relationship with the Free World system of voluntary controls over the
export of strategic goods to the Soviet Bloc and relates this program
of trade restriction to the foreign aid program of the United States.
Other laws, such as the Johnson Act, 10 prohibiting private loans to
countries in default in payment of their obligations to the United
States, have some political relevance but are of less importance in
economic warfare.
Emport Oontrol Act of 191,1)

The Export Control Act of 1949 is administered by the Secretary
of Commerce pursuant to authority delegated by the President.
~rhe Secretary of Commerce thus controls all exports except the
following: Armaments, aircraft, special airborne equipment and
63 Stat. 7 (1949) ; 50 U.S. Code App. 2021 et. seq. The act has been extended
several times.
s 40 Stat. 411 (1917); 50 U.S. Code App. 1 et. seq.
9 65 Stat. 644 (1951).
10 48 Stat. 57 4 ( 1934). Section 620 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
75 Stat. 424 (1961), prohibits assistance to the government of any country
which is indebted to any United States citizen for goods or services furnished,
when such citizen has exhausted available legal remedies and the debt is not
denied or contested by such government.
7
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helium, which are controlled by the Secretary of State; 11 atomic
materials and facilities, controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission; 12 and narcotics 13 and gold, 14 controlled by the Treasury
Department.
Pursuant to po,vers delegated by the President under Section
5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, the Secretary
of the Treasury controls shipments of strategic commodities by
foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations by the Foreign Assets
Transaction Regulations 15 and the Transaction Control Regulations.16 These regulations are enforced by action against the parent
company in the United States.
In Section 2 of the Export Control Act of 1949, the Congress
expressed its policy to use export controls:
* * * [T] o the extent necessary (a) to protect the domestic
economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to
reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demand;
1168 Stat. 848 (1954), 72 Stat. 267 (1958) ; 22 U.S. Code 1934 et seq. The
munitions list and licensing regulations appear in 22 CFR, Part 121 et seq.
Imports as well as exports of munitions are controlled by the Department of
State. Arms reduced to scrap, by being rendered useless beyond the possibility
of restoration to their former identity, are licensable as scrap by the Department of Commerce. lVlanufacturers, importers and exporters of the articles on
the munitions list are required to register with the Secretary of State. Intransit
licenses as well as export and import licenses are required.
12 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 70 Stat. 1071 (1956), 72 Stat. 276 (1958) ; 42 U.S. Code
2034 et seq. The controls over transactions in atomic rna terials are more
stringent than any other since these materials are handled by the Atomic
Energy Commission in a manner which amounts to a state-trading monoply.
The exports controlled by the Commission are (a) source material, of which
substantially none has ever been exported to the Soviet Bloc, (b) by-product
material of which small medicinal quantities have been licensed for export,
(c) special nuclear material, such as plutonium, which can only be exported by
the Commission and is not subject to licensing and (d) facilities for producing
and utilizing special nuclear materials, such as gaseous diffusion plants.
Nuclear materials of a special character and production and utilization facilities may be transferred only to nations or organization with which the United
States has agreements for cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act. There are
no such agreements with the Soviet Bloc but there is such an agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency to which Bloc countries belong. These
countries could obtain these items through the Agency, in which case Agency
controls would apply to assure that the items were used only for peaceful
purposes. No such case has arisen, Bloc countries being unwilling to accept the
controls required by the Agency.
13
21 U.S. Code 171 et seq~· 26 U.S. Code 2590, 3230 et seq.
14
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 337 (1934), and 12 U.S. Code 95 a
(section 5 (b) of tfie Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917).
t5 31 CFR, Part 500.
16 31 CFR, Part 505.
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(b) to further the foreign policy of the United States and to
aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities; and (c) to
exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to national security.
The Export Control Act has been used to control all commodities
and technical data exported to other countries except Canada; to
impose selective controls upon products shipped to the Soviet Bloc;
and to embargo all shipments to Red China, North Korea, North
Vietnam and other Communist controlled areas in the Far East.
The Department maintains a "Positive List" of commodities and
data considered critical to the military po·wer of the Soviet Bloc.
Validated licenses for listed items are required for each transaction. For items not on this list, general licenses are issued. General licenses authorize conditional export to specified destinations
\vithout the necessity of obtaining a special license for each export
transaction.
The activities of the Department of Commerce in export control
are coordinated with · those of other departments and agencies
through an Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP).
Membership is on the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant
Secretary level.
The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Interior, State and
Treasury, and the Federal Aviation Agency and National Aeronautical and Space Agency are represented. The Committee Chairman is the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International
Affairs.
Day-to-day coordination is provided by an Operating Committee
\vith representatives from the Departments and Agencies participating in the Advisory Con1mittee plus observers from the Atomic
Energy Commission and Office of Economic Planning. The Chairman of the Operating Committee is the Director of the Export
Policy Staff of the Office of the Director of the Bureau of International Programs in the Departlnent of Commerce. The Operating
Committee meets on call or the members may consult informally.
A third body, established by Executive Order, is the Export Control Review Board, consisting of the Secretaries of Commerce,
State and Defense, with the first as Chairman. Policy matters are
channeled through all three levels of decision.
These policy matters include such things as additions to or
deletions from the "positive list'~ and control problems affecting
particular countries or areas. A question of granting or denying
a particular license might or might not involve a broad policy
1natter. A license, for example, would be considered in the Operating
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Committee i:f a licensing officer was unable to determine readily
:from the positive list that it should be denied or granted. I:f all
members o:f the Operating Committee concur, the matter ends there,
although i:f the license is approved, it must go to the Secretary
o:f Commerce :for final approval. I:f a member o:f the Operating
Committee dissents, the matter goes to the Advisory Committee
on Export Policy (ACEP).
The same procedure is :followed in the Advisory Committee. I:f
a member o:f the Advisory Committee dissents, the matter is revie·w,ed by the Export Control Review Board. Matters o:f great
importance might be referred by the Board to the National Security
Council or to the President. The Secretary o:f Commerce can make
the final determination on the Export Control Review Board. In
practice a unanimity rule has been :followed.
The major sanction supporting the export licensing system is
denial o:f an export license. This denial may be :for a short period
or :for the duration o:f the Act. Notice and a hearing are required.
Criminal sanctions are also provided but are difficult to apply
because much o:f the evidence must come :from :foreign sources and
is not readily obtainable. Customs officials can seize and condemn
goods being exported or about to be exported in violation o:f the
Act and a vessel carrying prohibited goods can be required to
return to port and discharge unlicensed cargo.
Information required to enforce the Act is obtained :from various
sources, including United States Intelligence Agencies, Economic
Defense Officers o:f the Foreign Service in posts overseas, and the
F.B.I. The Department o:f Commerce also has its Commercial
Intelligence Division.

Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917
The controls over exports applied pursuant to the Export Control Act o:f 1949 can also be developed under the Trading With the
Enemy Act o:f 1917. This Act is intended principally as a basis
:for interdicting private communications between persons in the
United States and an enemy or ally o:f an enemy during a war
declared by the Congress. Section 5 (b) o:f this Act, added in 1933,
confers broad powers upon the President in time o:f peace as well.
To bring Section 5 (b) into operation, the President must declare
an emergency. A declaration o:f a national emergency was made by
the President in 1950 and is still in :force. The provisions o:f Section
5 (b) thus continue to operate.
The powers conferred upon the President by Section 5 (b) are:
(1) Investigate, regulate or prohibit any transaction in :foreign
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exchange, transfer of credit or payment between, by, through, or
to any banking institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding,
melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or
securities; and (2) Investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation o:f,
or dealing in, or exercising any right, power or privilege with
respect to, any transaction involving any property in which any
foreign country or national thereof has any interest.
The President has delegated his powers under this section to the
Secretary of the Treasury. As previously noted, transactions in gold
are controlled pursuant in part to these provisions.
Likewise foreign trade transactions in strategic commodities by
foreign corporations effectively controlled by domestic corporations
are subject to license under 5 (b) .17 Enforcement action is against
the domestic corporation. The effective control may be through
stock ownership or perhaps by patent licenses. Financial controls
have been imposed pursuant to this Section to block assets of Red
China, North Korea and their nationals in the United States and
to impose controls upon imports originating from these countries. 18
Exceptions can be made by Treasury licenses, but the boycott on
Red Chinese and North J{orean goods has been total. Section 5 (b)
of the Trading With the Enemy Act is thus like an accordion which
can be stretched or compressed as required to block imports or
exports and control financial transactions as determined by the
President.

Battle Act
The Battle Act is administered by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs. The purpose of this statute is to deny
strategic commodities to the Soviet Bloc by bringing pressure upon
countries receiving any form of United States aid to embargo these
items. The Battle Act lists are revised from time to time to take
account of economic · and scientific progress within the Bloc. The
latest revision was in 1960.
11 The restricted transactions are described in 31 CFR 505.10 as " * * * merchandise * * * included in the Positive~ List of Commodities set forth in 15 CFR
Part 399 and * * * identified on that list by the letter "A" in the column headed
'Commodity Lists' or is of a type the unauthorized exportation of which from
the United States is prohibited by any of the several regulations referred to in
15 CFR 370.4." These descriptions include only items of major strategic importance. '.rhe Treasury restrictions change as the Positive List is modified.
1s Transactions are also controlled in property in which either Egypt or the
Suez Canal Company has an interest. 31 CFR, Part 510.
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The critical features of the Act are : ( 1) selective controls such
as those used in the Export Control Act of 1949; (2) termination
of assistance to countries which ship interdicted items to the Bloc,
(a) on a mandatory basis if the shipment is on Battle Act List "A,"
armaments, atomic materials, etc., and (b) on a discretionary basis
if the shipment is of materials on Battle Act List "B," the President
having authority not to terminate if he finds unusual circumstances
indicating that curtailment of aid would be detrimental to the
security of the United States; and ( 3) creation of an administrative
ce:1ter to coordinate the controls of the United States with those of
the remainder of the Free World. There have been no terminations
of aid under the Battle Act, no items on List "A" having been
shipped and the President having found unusual circumstances in
shipments of items on List "B."
Although the Act, no doubt, has deterred some Free World shipments of strategic goods to the Soviet Bloc, its important effect has
been the development of a coordinating center, the Economic Defense
Advisory Committee (EDAC), paralleling in some respects the
Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) which functions in
the administration of the Export Control Act of 1949. However,
there is no special review board above EDAC.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Administrator of the Battle Act, serves as Chairman of EDA C. The
Committee contains representatives of the Departments of Defense,
Commerce and Treasury, the Atomic Energy Commission and
Central Intelligence Agency, and other departments or agencies
interested in particular questions subject to consideration.
There is a subsidiary executive committee, dealing with questions
not requiring resolution by EDAC as a whole, and two working
groups. The first deals with international export control systems,
and the second deals with enforcement and transshipment questions
having an international aspect.
EDAC is used to reach interdepartmental and agency agreement
concerning inst:ructions to field representatives dealing with the
international control system for strategic materials and to obtain
advice on Battle Act questions. For example, questions concerning
the licensing of transactions in strategic materials by foreign corporations effectively controlled by domestic corporations are referred
by the Treasury Department to EDAC for recommendation.

International Control Structure for Strategic Trade
The international control structure with which EDAC maintains liaison existed before passage of the Battle Act. This is the

98
Consultative Group ( CG), an in :formal voluntary organization o:£
fifteen Free World states, including the United States. 19
The Group has operating under it a permanent working comInittee, described as the Coordinating Committee ( COCOM) when it
deals with exports to the Soviet Union and the European satellites
and CHINCOM when it deals with exports to Red China, North
Korea and North Vietnam. The unanimity rule applied to all but
procedural questions and the obligations o:f the fifteen participating
states are moral only.
Until 1957 a differential existed between embargoed items to the
European Soviet Bloc and embargoed items to Red China. This was
abandoned because o:f pressure by a number o:£ Consultative Group
members. 20
There are currently two International Lists (IL). List I contains
embargoed items. List IV is a "Watch" list o:£ items which are
maintained under surveillance. Lists II and III (quantitative and
surveillance control items) ·were abolished in 1959.
A number o:£ supplementary controls are used. By the Import
Certificate-Delivery Verification System (IC/DV) a Consultative
Group state, before granting a license to export a controlled item,
requires the exporting firm to present an import certificate, executed
by the importing firm and certified by the state o:£ destination. The
certificate states that the shipment is actually destined :for the state
indicated and will not be diverted or reexported. The exporting
country may also obtain a certificate o:£ delivery verification in
which the importing state certifies that the goods were actually
delivered to the destination licensed.
Many o:£ the Consultative Group states also require Transit
Authorization Certificates (TAO) :for goods originating in member
states and on the embargo list passing through the territory o:f
another member en route to the Soviet Bloc. The TAO is issued by
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, The Netherlands, Turkey, Uniteo
Kingdom, United States. The system began with an Anglo-French list established in 1949. Each cooperating country has its own national control list. All
the NATO signatories except Iceland belong to the Consultative Group.
2>0 On :May 18, 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended
that every state apply an embargo on shipments to Red Chinese and North
Korean areas of "arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy
materials, petroleum," transportation resources, and items useful in arms production. At one time a strategic embargo on these items was applied by 45
states, but after the Korean Armistice in 1953 the restrictions were rapidly
jettisoned. CHINCOM was formed within the Consultative Group during this
period of general embargo upon items of military use. At one time approximately 200 more items were on the CHINCOl\1 list than on the COCOl\f list.
19
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the state of export and submitted to the state of transit. Transaction
controls, such as those maintained by the United States, are also
maintained by several other Consultative Group states. Shipping
and bunkering controls were imposed by members for several years
to restrict commerce ·with Red China.
The United States maintains a permanent delegation to COCOMCHINCOM which is directed by the .Department of State with the
advice of EDAC. The International Lists are revised annually and
the United States delegation participates in this revision.
The tendency has been to reduce the number of embargoed items
and to permit freer trade with the Soviet Bloc. This is due in part
to the expanding industries of the European Consultative Group
members and of Japan, the considerable dependence of these states
upon foreign trade, and a shortage of foreign exchange by which
supplies, particularly ra ·w materials, can be purchased in the West.
These states now receive no economic aid and the Battle Act has
not been invoked to press them towards more restrictive controls
because this would involve a withdrawal of military aid only. In
the words of Secretary Rusk: 21
* * * The United States has consistently pressed for a somewhat more restrictive policy than most of the other members
of COCOM ·would accept. We have had, therefore, to balance
the advantages of maintaining the COCOM system in order
that our influence might keep those restrictions as strong as
possible, or letting the system disappear and finding that the
COCOM controls might gradually ·wither away. * * *
The Battle Act has been helpful in influencing the policies of
states "\vhich are not members of the Consultative Group, although
the Bloc trade with these states in goods of a strategic nature has
been relatively small.
The United States, consequently, has fallen back to a unilateral
position with respect to its trade restrictions with the Soviet Bloc.
The "Positive List" of the Department of Commerce is based only
in part upon the International Lists and contains items which the
International List does not embargo. A total embargo and boycott is

maintained

on

trade "\vith Red China, North Korea and North

Vietnam, although such restrictions are not imposed by the other
Consultative Group states.
Validated licenses rather than Transit Authorization Certificates
21

Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement
of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts (Hearings Before Select

Committee on Export Control, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
Doc. 77836, 1961) , 73.
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are required for the transit of goods for which validated export
licenses are required. American petroleum companies are prohibited
from bunkering any vessel bound to or from Communist Far
Eastern ports or Macao ·without a Treasury license and a validated
license from the Department of Commerce is required for bunkering vessels or fueling aircraft which have called or will call at
Far Eastern Communist ports within stated time periods.22

Coordination of Aid Program and Trade Controls
The aid program of the United States is coordinated with the
program of trade control through EDAC. The Director of the
International Cooperation Administration was at one time Administrator of the Battle Act and participation in the work of
EDAC by representatives of the Agency for International Development (AID) created pursuant to the Act for International Development of 1961 23 will no doubt occur. The Secretary of State is
responsible under the Act for International Development for continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs
which the Act authorizes and integrating these at home and abroad
so the foreign pol icy of the United States is best served.
Prior to the Act for International Development of 1961 and
following World War II, the aid programs of the United States
emphasized: ( 1) reconstruction of the economies of wartime allies
(as in the Greek-Turkish aid program and the European Recovery
Program) ; (2) increasing military defenses of Free World countries; and ( 3) encouraging the economic development of underdeveloped countries, now usually described as ''less developed"
countries. The Military Assistance Program and economic aid to
support military defense efforts were the largest aid projects during
the 1950's .
.22 See The Strategic Trade Control System, 1948-1956: Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Ninth Report to Congress (1957), 35-37; 15 CFR

371.13(2) and 371.13(3) (b) (2).
23 P.L. 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961; 75 Stat. 424 (1961), Part I (1961). The entire
Act is described as the Mutual Security Act of 1961. Part II of the law has the
short title, "International Peace and Security Act of 1961." The Agency for
International Development, which administers Part I, was established by Ex.
Or. 10973, 26 FR 10469 (1961). The Agency supersedes the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund. The functions of
the Export-Import Bank relating to loans under section 104(e) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 454 ( 1954) ; 7
U.S. Code 1961 et seq. (1954), often called "P. L. 480" have also been transferred to the Agency. While the functions of the Agency are more embracing
than those of International Cooperation Administration, it continues as part of
the Department of State, its Administrator having the status of an Under
Secretary of State.
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These programs are now superseded in importance by attention to
the "less developed" countries-using development loans, grants
and technical cooperation; encouraging private investment by Federal guaranties against inability to convert earnings to dollars,
foreign expropriation or confiscation, and loss due to 'var, revolution
and insurrection; financing private business surveys; encouraging
research; and contributing to the work o£ International Organizations in "less developed'' countries. The Military Assistance program
is continued, $1,700,000,000 being appropriated by the Congress to
this purpose £or each o£ the fiscal years 1962 and 1963. The program
is administered by the Department o£ Defense under the general
negotiating and coordinating authority o£ the Secretary o£ State.
The Foreign Aid program, apart £rom its military aspects, now
seems aimed to achieve global environmental changes. The countries
aided are permitted to formulate· their individual plans £or development. They are given advice as to reforms; but each is encouraged
to develop its o'vn image o£ a "free society."
Unlike earlier programs, which were geared to Soviet Bloc
political movements, the current aid trend seems to recognize the
menace o£ Communist action but to divorce substantially the United
States aid program £rom a pattern o£ response. As stated by the
President's Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance: 24
It is important that the United States, in its desire to offset
these dangers, not engage in a frantic competition to outbid the
Bloc's offers o£ aid or seek to prevent countries £rom accepting
aid that will help them. To react this way would involve us in
waste, draw us into an undignified posture, and open us to the
charge o£ not being sympathetic to the economic development o£
other countries except on our own political terms. The size and
effectiveness o£ the Communist effort are reasons £or concern and
self-examination but not alarm. They emphasize the need £or
the United States to make its aid as effective as possible, timely,
vigorous, and responsive to short-term as well as long-term considerations. I£ we do these things and our actions are contructive and politically 'vise, the aid coming £rom the Commnnist
Bloc should not 'vorry us. The increasingly effective Bloc effort
is a challenge and a reminder to the United States that it
cannot afford to make anything less than a major effort, designed
and administered in such a way as to achieve maximum results
o£ the right kind.
Broad and flexible authority is conferred upon the President in
24

An Act for International Development, A Summary Presentation, June 1961

(Department of State Publication 7205), 189.
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the Acts for International Development and International Peace
and Security, including authority to give certain kinds of aid subject to limitations in amounts despite the provisions of the Battle
Act. 25 There is also broad authority to give "supporting assistance" 26
from a contingency fund; and authority to use $50,000,000 for the
funds appropriated for purposes 'vhich he need not disclose upon
certification. 27 Action of a nature 'vhich 'vould not be disclosed might
be taken in economic 'varfare by the Central Intelligence Agency
or some similar executive institution. However, because of its general object to secure massive environmental changes, the Aid
structure does not seem to be readily adaptable for coordination
with a program of trade restriction, even though EDAC is available
for that purpose.

Current

Econo~mic

Warfare Posture

The present economic warfare posture of the United States is
one of attempting to buy "lead time" by impeding the development
of Soviet Bloc economies through use of a program of export and
import controls. This "lead time" is used by subsidizing its scientific development; improving the defensive capacity of its allies;
and by a massive effort to change the environments of "less developed" and uncommitted countries.
The idea that wealth might be used offensively, or might be carefully focused for political ends, seems not to have been entertained
seriously in the program. Congress has retained much control
over the trade control and aid programs by reporting requirements
and investigations. This control perhaps has discouraged initiative
in the offensive use of wealth in situations sensitive in domestic
politics.
It is unlikely that this United States defensive structure will
undergo more than the slow mutations exhibited since World War
II. Thus, any flexibility 'vhich can be developed to fend and return
skillfully engineered Soviet Bloc "economic sorties~' will have to be
derived from laws 'vhich have never been fully utilized. One of
these is Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917.
Other treaties and domestic la ·ws remain to be explored by the
responsible administrators. There ·will be a premium upon ingenuity
and speed in administrative interpretation of existing laws.
In the past decade of active political application by the Soviet
Union and Bloc states of their increasing economic strength in
foreign affairs, intervention by the Soviet Union in support of the
P.L. 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961; 75 Stat. 424 (1961), section 614 a.
I d., sections 401, 402, 451.
27 I d., section 614 c.

2s

26
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Castro regime in Cuba demonstrates the purpose and skill with
'vhich Bloc economic power can be brought to bear to support
Communist political objectives. The case suggests also the importance of administrative ingenuity and speed in the United States
in utilizing hitherto unutilized laws in economic warfare. T he perils
of defensive, cautious and 'veil-meaning economic policies when
opposed to an aggressive, carefully aimed, and coordinated Communist "economic sortie" are amply demonstrated.

B. SUGAR ECONOMIES OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES :
THE LEGAL MILIEU FOR WEALTH BALANCE
The Cuban economy is based substantially upon the production
and export of unrefined sugar. Cuba is the major sugar exporter and
is second only to the Soviet Union as a sugar producer. In 1959,
the first year of the Castro revolution, Cuba produced 6,577,000
tons. Of this production, 3,437,582 tons, or slightly more than half,
was exported to the United States.
The United States is a closed sugar market. This means that
both production of sugar within the United States and its p ossessions and imports into these areas are limited. The limitations are
to maintain the domestic sugar price and to develop dependable
sources of supply.

Sugar Act of 1948
The production and marketing of sugar within the United States
was regulated in 1959 by the Sugar Act of 1948.28 This Act
originated as the Jones-Costigan Amendment to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, 29 and was carried over as the Sugar Act of 1937
when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was held unconstitutional by
the United States Supreme Court.
By the Sugar Act of 1948, as in force with amendments in 1959,30
the Secretary of Agriculture determined in December of each year
the probable sugar consumption in the United States for the year
following. This tonnage 'vas then divided up among domestic and
foreign producers in accordance with a quota system set forth in the
statute.
The statute established the basic need of the United States for
sugar at 8,350,000 tons. Although the actual sugar consumption at
61 Stat. 922 (1947).
46 Stat. 670 (1934).
30 Amendments at the end of 1961 appear in 65 Stat. 318 (1951) ; 70 Stat. 217
(1956) ; 74 Stat. 330 (1960) ; and 75 Stat. 40 (1961).
28
29
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the time the statute was passed \vas greater than this, and ever
since has greatly exceeded this figure, domestic and import quotas
\Vere computed in relation to this tonnage.
A minimum quota :for domestic producers was established in
the statute at 4,444,000 tons. This minimum quota was allotted
among domestic beet producers ( 1,800,000), mainland cane producers ( 500,000) and the remainder among cane producers in Hawaii,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. To this minimum quota was
added 55% o:f the amount by \vhich the probable sugar consumption
as determined by the Secretary o:f Agriculture exceeded the "basic
statutory" need o:f 8,350,000 tons. A quota o:f 952,000 tons was
established :for the Republic o:f the Philippines.
Cuba received 96% o:f the amount by which the basic statutory
need o:f 8,350,000 tons (or a lesser amount determined by the
Secretary as the actual probable consumption) exceeded the minimum quota :for domestic producers ( 4,444,000) plus the quota :for
the Philippines (952,000). Cuba also received 29.59% o:f the amount
by which the actual probable consumption as determined by the
Secretary exceeded the basic statutory need (8,350,000). This additional tonnage has always been substantial.
A minimum Cuban quota \vas fixed at 28.6% o:f the total United
States consumption estimated by the Secretary i:f this estimate was
7,400,000 tons or less; and at 2,116,000 tons i:f the actual consumption was estimated at more than 7,400,000 tons. The quota o:f domestic producers was to be reduced pro rata to make up the minimum Cuban quota, although the Cuban quota has always been well
above 2,116,000 tons.
Foreign producers, other than Cuba and the Philippines, received
4% o:f the amount by \vhich the basic statutory need (8,350,000)
exceeded the minimum quota :for domestic sugar producers plus
the quota o:f the Philippines. This :foreign p:!:'oducer quota was
prorated in accordance with a statutory scale.
O:f the amount o:f probable consumption in excess o:f the basic
statutory need ( 8,350,000) allocated to these less :favored :foreign
producers, the Dominican Republic received 4.95%, Peru 4.33%,
Mexico 5.10% and the remaining 1.03% \vas divided among other
:foreign suppliers by a :formula lfased upon experience with their
tonnage exported to the United States under earlier quota allocations.
I:f a domestic producer or :foreign supplier :failed to fill its quota,
the deficit \vas allocated among other quota holders. I:f a domestic
producer or Cuba defaulted, the reallocation was made first to
domestic producers. I:f they \Vould not fill the new quota, the
allocation \vas to Cuba. I:f the Philippines :failed to fill its quota,
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Cuba was allocated 96% of the deficit and the other foreign producers received 4%. If any foreign producer other than the Philippines failed to fill its quota, the entire deficit went to Cuba; and
if Cuba could not fill the deficit, the Secretary could allocate it.
Under the Sugar Act of 1948, Cuba thus enjoyed marketing
privileges comparable to those of domestic producers. Sugar consumption in the United States ·was rapidly increasing. Assuming
continued controls upon the acreage of domestic producers, and
no significant breakthroughs in methods of production, Cuba could
reasonably expect an expanding and lucrative United States market.
The United States 1narket had special appeal for all foreign suppliers because of its high sugar price. By manipulating his estimates
of probable annual consumption, the Secretary of Agriculture,
although he could not control prices directly, nevertheless controlled
them indirectly by increasing or decreasing domestic and import
quotas, subject to the minimum quotas established. By this method,
the Secretary maintained the United States price at about 2 cents
per pound above the world market.
While all foreign suppliers having quotas enjoyed this price
advantage, Cuba also received a 20% tariff preference on sugar
imported into the lJnited States. This preference was based on a
treaty made in 1902.31 A tariff of 4/8 of a cent per pound was thus
levied on Cuban sugar as compared with 5/8 of a cent per pound
on the sugar of all other foreign suppliers except the Philippines. 32
In 1959, this privileged position of Cuban producers enabled them to
make approximately $159,000,000 more upon that part of the crop
sold in the United States than if the sales had been on the world
market.
The favored position of Cuba stemmed in part from recognition
of historic patterns in the sugar trade and in part from the close
friendship existing bet-\veen the t-wo countries. But the favored
position of Cuba ·was founded also upon intensely practical considerations.
There were important business reasons for the Cuban preference.
Cuba ·was a major consumer of United States exports. Approximately
4/5ths of Cuba's visible imports came from the United States and
33 Stat. 2163 (1903-5).
By the Philippine Trade Act, 60 Stat. 141 (1946) the Philippine quota is
set at 982,000 tons annually for the period 1 January 1946 through 3 July 1974.
Until 3 July 1954 the sugar was admitted duty free. For the remainder of 1954
the rate was 5% of the lowest rate charged another country. For 1955 the rate
was 10% of the lowest rate charged any other country; and each year thereafter it is increased 5% until it reaches 100% on 1 January 1973.
31
32
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were principally in machinery, motor vehicles, cotton manufactures,
rice, wheat, flour and lard. The Cuban sugar preference supplied
dollars which could be used to pay for these products. Investments
by United States citizens in Cuba were greater than in any other
country in the 1Vestern Hemisphere except Canada. These investors
benefitted by Cuban trade 'vith the United States which in turn
depended largely upon the sugar preference.
United States nationals o1vned 36 out of the 116 mills producing
ra\v sugar in Cuba. T he United States corporations owning these
mills also o\vned much land upon 'vhich sugar cane was raised.
The Atlantica del Golfo and Rionda Groups of American Sugar
!fills held approximately 500,000 acres each. Cuban-American Sugar
Company held 330,000 acres; and the United Fruit Company 226,000
acres. A preference for Cuban sugar meant a preference directly for
a substantial nun1ber of United States stockholders.
There \Yere important strategic grounds for the Cuban preference.
Communist influence had been present in Cuba from the early years
of the Depression of 1929. Special privileges for Cuban sugar
producers in the United States n1arket created jobs and established
a wage level 'vhich \Yould not have been possible if all of Cuba's
sugar production had been sold on the \Vorld market.
Although the standard of living for most Cubans remained quite
low, the standard \vas higher than in most of the rest of Latin
America, and would have been lo,ver \Yithout the United States
market preference. \Vith a decreasing standard of living, Cuba
might have become increasingly vulnerable to Communist infiltration, although the pattern of Communist conquest has since suggested
that its major appeal is to educated groups 'vith a relatively high
living standard.
In addition to its familiar use as food, sugar is also used in the
manufacture of plastics, drugs, antifreeze, synthetic rubber, ethyl
alcohol and numerous other products important in national defense.
About one acre of cane produces the ethyl alcohol needed to manufacture smokeless po,vder sufficient to propel fifteen five-inch shells.
Cuba has supplied about 11:3 of the total sugar needed for food
and manufacturing in the United States and has done this at stable
prices during periods of international crisis. The geographic position of Cuba simplifies the protection of cargo vessels transporting
sugar to the United States. Shipping costs and insurance rates
during \vartime tend to be lo,ver. Cuba was a relatively secure and
dependable source of sugar and the United States was anxious to
encourage and protect its reliable foreign supplier.

107

World Sugar 11!arket
The bulk of the ·world sugar production is sold in closed markets
such as in the United States under the Sugar Act of 1948. The most
important of these are created by the British Common·wealth and
French Agreements, although the sugar sales by Cuba in these
markets ·would under any circumstances be less than in the United
States. The trade bet-ween the Soviet Union and its satellites has
so1ne of the characteristics of a closed market since this trade is in
barter or in nonconvertible currencies. For this reason trade in a
Bloc market is not desirable for a country ·which expects to purchase
Western goods.
Only about 10% to 15% of the 'vorld sugar production is sold in
the "world" or "free" market, although it was here that much of
the Cuban sugar production ·was marketed. Sugar prices in the
free market tend to be both low and erratic.
The depressed free market price is caused by chronic overproduction of sugar. "'\Vorld sugar production was 64,625,000 tons in 1959.
Of this, 7,494,000 "\vas thrown on the free market, although there was
a free-market sale of only 6,283,000 tons.
For the ten years bet,veen 1950 and 1960, ·world sugar consumption increased at about 5% per annum. World sugar production
increased at about 10% per annum. Per capita sugar consumption
is low in many countries-about three pounds per capita in Red
China as compared 'vith one hundred and one pounds per capita
in the United States. This low consumption in the "under" or "less"
developed countries may increase. A parallel increase in sugar
production is also forecast. Ho,vever, the supply is likely to co.p.tinue to exceed the amount marketable. A number of countries,
such as West Germany and India, "\Vere finding it difficult to market
their sugar surpluses in 1961, although they had experienced no
major marketing difficulty in previous years.
The erratic prices on the free market are due principally to
weather and "\Vorld tension. A prolonged drought in Eastern Europe
in 1960 raised the price of beet sugar on the free market by reducing
the supply.
When the Batista government was overthrown in 1959, the freemarket price of sugar "\Vas 3.67 cents per pound. This unusually
high price for the free market resulted from the threat to the
Cuban supply from Castro's burning of cane fields. The price
dropped to 3.1 cents per pound in February 1959, \vhen the Cuban
supply was thought assured by Batista's overthrow.
In World Wars I and II, the l{orean War and the Suez Crisis,
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the :free-market price jumped appreciably. The price declined with
alacrity when tensions were reduced.
Because o:£ fluctuations in the :free-market price, attempts have
been made to attain price stability by a series o:£ multilateral
treaties. Cuba and the United States have joined in all since the
first treaty in 1937.
The International Sugar Agreement in :force in 1959 33 permits
an International Sugar Council to set export quotas in the :free
market. These quotas may be above or belo·w a basic tonnage :for
exporting countries ·which the Agreement specifies.
A minimum desired :free-market price is set at 3.25 cents per
pound. I:£ the price on the :free market dips belo\v this :for seventeen
successive business days, the Council is required to cut export quotas
by 21j2 % and is permitted to cut quotas by 10%. I:£ the price :falls
below 3.15 cents per pound, the Council may cut export quotas up
to 20%. This is the maximum cut permitted. Exporting countries
(such as Cuba) agree to limit production and exports; and importing countries (such as the United States) agree to restrict imports
:from nonparticipating sources. All important sugar producers, \vith
the exception o:£ Red China, are parties to the Agreement.
The Sugar Council meets periodically to consider quotas. Voting
in the Council is \Veighted. One thousand votes are allocated to
sugar exporters (including Cuba) and 1,000 votes to sugar importers (including the United States). The number o:£ votes allocated
to each participating country differ. As importers, the United States
and the United Kingdom each have 245 votes as compared to 10
votes :for Ghana. Cuba has 245 votes as a sugar exporter, compared
with 95 votes :for the Soviet Union and 10 votes :for Haiti.
Provisions are liberal :for \vithdra\ving :from the Agreement after
notice by the ·withdra\ving party. Cuba, :for practical purposes, is
an essential party to the Agreement. Without Cuban participation
the :free-market price would be unduly difficult to stabilize.
Cuba has the largest :free-market quota. This is 2,415,000 tons,
subject to reconsideration in 1962.34 So long as Cuba desires to sell
sugar on the :free market, it is probably in her interest to remain a

party to the Agreement. If Cuba desires to withdraw from the
Agreement and depress the \Yorld price by dumping her marketable
sugar, there is no \Yay in \vhich this \vithdrawal can be prevented.
But dumping her marketable sugar on the 1narket without a :£or1nal
3310 U.S. Treaties 2189.
34 The Cuban quota was actually reconsidered in December 1961 on a special
Cuban request for a quota increase to cover its sales to the Soviet Union. There
being no agreement on this increase in the Council, the Sugar Agreement appeared on the verge of co11apse.
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'vithdrawal from the Agreement pursuant to its terms would place
Cuba in violation of a treaty obligation.
Since 1959, the free-market price has tended to fluctuate below 3
cents per pound. Under these circumstances, parties to the Agreement may take unilateral action to limit exports. Cuba, in 1960, set
3.25 cents per pound as the price for Cuban sugar on the free m arket
and the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute made substantial purchases to reduce the amount available :for export. Because the cost
of production of raw sugar in Cuba was approximately 4 cents per
pound in 1959 and 1960 and the free-market price was substantially
below this, the 2 cents per pound premium which Cuban sugar
brought in the closed United States market ·was essential to make
production profitable.

C. CUBAN-COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND THE
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1959 AND
EARLY 1960
Despite the clear dependence o:f the Cuban sugar industry upon
the closed market of the United States, the difficulties involved in
diversifying agriculture and developing new industries in Cuba, and
the evident interest of the United States in continuing Cuban sugar
pre:ferences, the Castro regime, sparked by its Communist elements,
began a hostile campaign against the United States early in 1959.
'This campaign was designed ultimately to disrupt relations bet,veen
the United States and Cuba, neutralize the power o:£ Cuban moderates, and pave the 'vay :for Cuban entrance into the Soviet Bloc.
Pending the purge of moderate adherents to the regime and
liquidation o:£ the Cuban political opposition, and until a minimum program o:£ Soviet economic assistance to Cuba could be
developed, it 'vas important .to Castro that Cuban pre:ferences in
the United States sugar market be preserved. The pre:ferences were,
however, regarded as a fulcrum for political leverage by the United
States and thus incompatible with the radical reorientation planned
for Cuban political relations. The preferences 'vere desired by Cuba
only as an interim device to develop foreign exchange. Cuban holdings of foreign exchange were low due to withdrawals by Batista
officials. These holdings 'vere further diminished by the inept management of the Castro government.
Castro thus had to deal with a delicate problem o:£ balancedisturbing relations with the United States sufficiently to justify
his Communization of the Cuban government and liquidation of the
labor unions and other potential sources o:£ opposition while at the
same time keeping the Cuban sugar quota as long as possible to tide
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him over the thin years which the revelation of his Communist ties
would probably bring.
The Castro regime accordingly commenced an economic offensive.
This was designed to disturb the psychical equilibria of officials in
the United States and delay the response of the Administration
as the Communist ties of the regime received publicity.
Cuban representatives contended, first, that the Cuban sugar quota
should be removed from the Act of 1948 and incorporated into a
ne'v bilateral treaty bet,veen Cuba and the United States. The
ostensible purpose of this move was to prevent fluctuations in the
Cuban quota by removing it from the influence of domestic politics.
The actual purpose ·was to develop an international legal argument to assert to forestall future disciplinary cuts in the quota.
Restoration of the Cuban sugar preferences as these existed
before 1956 was also sought. The Sugar Act of 1948 had been
amended in 1956 to limit Cuba's "deficit quota'~ to 29.6% of the
excess above the basic 8,350,000 tons; 96% of this excess had been
allocated to Cuba prior to 1956. While Cuba sold more sugar in
the United States after 1956 than before, this increased sale had
been due to an increased United States consumption. A return to
the earlier formula 'vould greatly increase Cuban sugar sales
during 1960.
These demands by the Castro regime fell upon deaf ears both in
the Administration and in Congress. Concern as to the nature and
direction of the Castro movement had been stimulated during the
late 'vinter and early spring of 1959. Earlier hopes for moderation
by Castro as the heat of victory subsided, 'vere salted 'vith profound skepticism concerning his personal qualities as a leader and
uncertainty concerning the political orientation of many of his
principal advisers.
Faced with this gradual loss of sympathy and confidence, and
'vith the negative response to his efforts to secure guarantees of
the sugar quota during 1960, Castro announced his Agrarian Reform
Law. Agrarian reform had been an objective of the Castro revolution
and changes in the Cuban landholding system 'vere clearly needed.
"~as aimed principally at the holdings of Amer.
companies.

This Ia,v, ho,vever,

.

1can sugar
Its terms and timing, by suspending a s,vord of Damocles over
the ownership of American properties in Cuba, were designed to
force a continuation of the sugar preferences at least through the
marketing season of 1960. The administrative discretion and flexibility derived from the vague provisions of the law permitted indefinite postponement of action to expropriate the American properties.
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The Castro regime could thus publish the law but announce that
no action ·would be taken under it until the close of the 1960 marketing season. The Sugar Act of 1948 ·was required by its terms to be
reviewed in 1960. The threat of expropriation, coupled with the hope
instilled in the corporate stockholders that Castro might be made to
"see the light," might make Congress reluctant to cut or eliminate
the Cuban quota despite the development of closer ties between
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
The essential elements of the Reform Law were severance of cane
grinding from cane production and restriction of ownership of
grinding mills either to Cuban nationals or to corporations totally
owned by Cuban nationals. Land o·wnership was limited to 1,000
acres per person or corporation. No cane land could be sold to a
foreign national. Ninety days "\vere allowed to convert the stock in
mill corporations to Cuban ownership.
Compensation for the expropriated property was to be in 4%
Cuban bonds payable in 30 years. The basis of compensation was to
be the tax value of the land prior to 10 October 1958. In 1958 the
assessed tax value had been a small fraction of the market value.
After the Reform Law '"Tas published, the market value of cane
land promptly dropped from $16,800 per hundred acres to $7,800
per hundred acres.
Coupled with the threat by the Castro regime, intended to influence United States domestic commercial interests, 140,000 United
States stockholders being affected by seizure of the sugar properties,
were restrictions placed upon imports from the United States into
Cuba. These restrictions had the dual object of lessening the outflow
of foreign exchange from Cuba and bringing home to American
exporters the importance of the Cuban market.
These efforts by the Castro regime to influence domestic commercial interests and opinion generally in the United States raised
questions concerning Cuba's obligations pursuant to Articles 15
and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. These
Articles state :
Article 15: No state, or group of states, has the right to
intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever in
the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing
principle prohibits not only armed force, but also any other
form of interference or attempted threat against the personality
of the state or against its political, economical and cultural elements.
Article 16: No state may use or encourage the use of coercive
measures of an economic or political character in order to
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force the ·will of another state and obtain from it advantages
of any kind.
While it is doubtful this action by the Castro regime was of an
intensity constituting a violation of Article 16 of the Charter, the
various measures in their timing and administration seemed designed to force the ""'ills of men1bers of the Executive Branch and
Congress. The measures 'vere only partly bona fide agricultural
reforms and limitations upon the outflo,v of foreign exchange.

Ouban Sugar Situation in 1959 and 1960
During 1959, despite a 20% cut in the free-market quota by the
Sugar Council, the price dropped to 2.55 cents per pound. The
Soviet Union purchased 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar in 1959. However, this purchase 'vas at the free-1narket price and substantially
below the cost of production.
Although a backlog of 1,000,000 tons 'vould probably be carried
over by Cuba from 1959 into 1960, the prospect for production
during 1960 'vas poor. Faced ,vith possible expropriation of their
mills and land, the sugar operators 'vere reluctant to make the major
repairs necessary for the 1960 grinding season. Banks 'vere unwilling
to lend to the s1naller producers. The "rages for many laborers in
1959 were unpaid. Labor unions, 'vhich had accepted a moratorium
on wage increases during 1959, 'vere preparing to make new claims
during 1960. Counterrevolutionary activity, including sabotage of
sugar mills and burning of cane fields, 'vas commencing in Las
Villas and Oriente Provinces. Refugees from the Castro tyranny
were organizing throughout the Caribbean.
These domestic problems 'vith 'vhich Castro grappled increased
slightly the free-market price of sugar. But the tables could be
quickly turned. The sugar 'vhich Cuba probably could produce in
1960 plus the carry-over from 1959 would be channelled into the
United States quota for 1960. This was estimated tentatively by
the Secretary of Agriculture at 3,119,655 tons.
Ii this quota ""'as quickly reduced in 1959 or early 1960, the
rejected tonnage 'vould be thro,vn into the free market. This would
force down the free-market price and the price 'vould quite probably
remain low 'vith the prospect of the entire Cuban supply being
marketed in a competitive pricing system.
Cuba might or might not gd to the International Sugar Council
to seek an increase in her free-market quota. If sufficient sugar was
produced in 1960 to require this increase and the consent of the
Sugar Council could not be obtained, the unsold surplus would have
to be carried over into 1961; sold in a ne'v n1arket, such as Red
China, from 'vhich little foreign exchange could be obtained; sold
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in the free market in violation of t he Sugar Agreement; or sold in
the British or French markets. Neither England nor France might
agree to these imports. Sugar sales \vould not be profitable in any
event unless the sugar entered a closed market providing a price
premium.

A Possible Defen.•rive Scheme for the United States
Employing Economic Sortie Techniques
The most effective economic defense which the United States
could have mounted against the Castro regime in 1959 or early
1960 would have been aimed to disturb the psychical equilibria of
key members of the regime elite.
First, the plan to curtail or eliminate the sugar quota should be
promptly disclosed. Castro should be notified explicitly what was
desired in return for continuation of the quota. Second, if Castro
did not respond promptly to this notification, withdrawal of the
quota should be executed rapidly. Coupled with this withdrawal
should be a clear commitment that the quota would be restored if
Castro met the terms proposed. Third, the quota should be restored if Castro met the terms.
To achieve the most intense economic impact upon the Castro
regime, manipulation of the sugar quota should be supported by
simultaneous economic action of other types. Thus, an embargo,
boycott and financial controls should be imposed upon Cuban transactions under Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of
1917.35 These measures should be hinged upon the same conditions
prescribed for restoration of the sugar quota.
A partial embargo, in fact, was imposed in October 1960, under
the Export Control Act of 1949. This embargo covered all materials
except nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies. 36
But the embargo came too late for its pressure to be coordinated
with that of withdraw·a] of the sugar quota.
The action suggested would have invited grave risks in 1959 and
early 1960. Castro might not respond by agreeing to negotiate outstanding differences bet,veen Cuba and the United States or by
conceding other points pressed by the Administration. He might, as
he later did, ~ommence a general confiscation of American assets
and patently cast his lot with the Soviet Bloc.
If these further actions were taken by the Castro regime, the
United States should be prepared to move for joint economic saneSee Fn. 8, supra, and discussion of the provisions of Section 5 (b) in the
related text.
aa 25 Federal Register 8638 (1960).
35
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tions imposed by the Organization of American States. Action should
be taken to preserve the status quo pending a decision by that
Organization. This action should probably be, for greatest effectiveness, a naval blockade or quarantine of Cuban ports. Justification
could be offered for such a blockade or quarantine based upon its
basically defensive nature and upon its international administrative
function as a stat~ts q'Uo maintaining device. Maintaining the stat'US
q'Uo politically would give the Organization time for mature consideration of the issues and increase the effectiveness of military
or economic measures it employed.
The scheme of action here suggested 'vas not followed by the
United States in meeting the Castro economic sortie. While percep·
tive moderate advisers of Castro remained in 1959 and early 1960,
a defensive economic sortie might have influenced Cuban policy in
a direction desired by the United States.
As the United States delayed its responsive action, in part due to
legal problems in organizing its defense, the structure of the Castro
power elite began to change. Members of the elite who could make
the required decisions became difficult to identify.
An effective defensive economic sortie at this later stage would
have imposed a heavy intelligence burden and would have required
a period of intense psychological preparation of the target elite.
The United States consequently fell into a posture of protracted
harassment in economic warfare with Cuba; and due in part to
intervention by the Soviet Union became locked in this position.
Problems created by protracted harassment have been discussed
in Chapter I. What were the reasons for this delay of the United
States in organizing its economic defense?
D. DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANIZING THE UNITED STATES
DEFENSIVE POSITION
Lack of Economic Warfare Professionals

Apart from the very evident good faith with which the United
States commenced relations with Castro Cuba, the major reason
why no prompt response was made to the Castro economic sortie
lies in the absence of a corps of specialists in economic warfare
within the Administration to advise the President.
Had the Castro regime launched a military attack upon the
United States, this action could have been met promptly and effectively by professional specialists in military violence. There were
no specialists in economic violence. This fact invited the Castro
regime to launch its economic sortie.
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The foreign economic program of the United States was geared
to developing scientific "lead-tilne," buttressing military defenses,
and altering the environments of underdeveloped countries. The
domestic economic program \Vas geared to evolution of a dyna1nic
and growing industrial, investment and employment structure.
Persons associated with these programs had not developed perspectives enabling them to advise an economic sortie designed to obtain
a decision or pattern of decisions from key members of an adversary
power elite. The roots of the difficulty reached back to the abandonment of economic violence following 1Vorld War II and the concepts of foreign assistance which developed in its aftermath.
Various persons in the United States during 1959 suggested the
Cuban sugar quota be cut or eliminated, the Cuban premium of 2
cents per pound on the United States market be abandoned, or the
tariff preference for Cuba be jettisoned. The Administration nevertheless proceeded cautiously. This caution seems to be justified in
view of the facts and law as members of the Administration perceived these at the time.

Intelligence Problem
Although Soviet Bloc control of the Castro regime now appears
to have been extensive before and after the Castro success in 1959,
this was not equally clear in 1959 and early 1960. The actual state
of United States intelligence upon this point will not be publicized.
However, it is probably accurate to assume that either little was
known at the time concerning the extent of Communist control or,
if there was information upon the point, the facts were in much
conflict.

International Legal Considerations
The Administration was anxious to conform to the requirements
of international law in its dealings with the Castro regime, had a
sincere desire to preserve amicable relations between the countries,
and hoped to avoid needless injury to the Cuban people.
During the heated debates in Congress in 1960 concerning the
Cuban sugar quofa, Secretary of State Herter carried with him
constantly Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States typed on a filing card so he could refer instantly
to them in his discussions \vith members of the Congress. 37 Article
16, mentioned previously, forbade a state to use "coercive Ieeasures
of an economic nature to force the will of another state and obtain
from it advantages of any kind."
87

Reston, New York Times, 1 July 1960, p. 24, col. 3.

116
The Administration was also concerned that action o£ the United
States be consistent with the purposes and principles set forth in
Articles I and II o£ the United Nations Charter. Although no
provisions o£ the Charter expressly obligated the United States
to refrain £rom economic action against a member o£ the Organization, there was a requirement that members o£ the Organization
settle their international disputes by "peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered." This might be used to support an argument that the
United States "endangered peace or security" or "denied justice"
by terminating an economic privilege upon which Cuba relied.
A more direct difficulty \vas presented by the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral executive agreement,
to which the United States and Cuba are parties. 38 As an executive
agreement on the part o£ the United States, GATT has the obligatory effect o£ a treaty. GATT posed difficulties which might be
encountered both in reducing the sugar quota and in eliminating
the Cuban tariff preference on sugar, each being moves urged upon
the Administration.
By Article XI o£ GATT, no prohibition or restriction, other
than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be placed
on the imports £rom or exports to any other contracting party.
Restrictions upon imports o£ agricultural products are excepted
£rom application o£ the Article when these restrict]ons support
enforcement o£ domestic restrictions upon like products. N evertheless, any such restrictions must not reduce the total o£ imports
relative to the total domestic production, as compared with the
proportion which reasonably might be expected to rule between the
two in the absence o£ restr]ctions.
The Article is intended to accommodate a quota system, such
as that used by the l Tnited States to control imports and production
o£ sugar; but the Article is intended also to preserve the normal
pattern o£ all imports o£ sugar as against all domestic production
o£ sugar. I£ the United States eliminated the Cuban sugar quota
as 61 Stat. A5 (1947). GATT originated from tariff negotiations at the Geneva
Conference of 1947 while the Havana Charter was in process of drafting. The
Havana Charter and the International Trade Organization to be established
under it failed because of the decision of the President not to submit the Charter to the Senate. Other states were unwilling to participate without the United
States. GATT, however, has served as a point for institutional growth of the
demands expressed in part in the Havana Charter, although the scope of GATT
is much narrower. The most comprehensive text concerning GATT is V. A.
Seyid Muhammad, The Legal Framework of World Trade (1958).
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and, in its distribution o£ the deficit, showed preference to domestic
producers, thereby altering the pattern o£ domestic production
vis-a-vis imports, the United States might violate the A greement.
By Article XIII o£ GATT, no prohibition or restriction shall be
placed by any contracting party upon imports or expor ts o£ any
other contracting party unless the prohibitions and restrictions are
like,vise applied to all third countries importing or exporting like
products. Paragraph 2 o£ this Article states in part:
In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting
parties shall aim at a distribution o£ trade in such produce
approaching as closely as possible to the shares 'vhich the
various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the
absence o£ such restrictions, and to this end shall observe the
following provisions: * * *
(d) In cases in ,vhich a quota is allocated among supplying
countries, the contracting party applying the restrictions may
seek agreement 'vith respect to the allocation o£ shares in the
quota 'vith all other contracting parties having a substantial
interest in supplying the produce concerned. In cases in which
this method is not reasonably practicable, the contracting
party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a
substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon
the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties during
a previous representative period, o£ the total quantity or value
o£ imports o£ the product, due account being taken of any
special £actors which may have affected or may be affecting the
trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any contracting party £rom utilizing
fully the share o£ any such total quantity or value which has
been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within
any prescribed period to 'vhich the quota may relate. * * *
An argument may be made under Article XIII that the Cuban
quota could not be eliminated by the United States unless the
quotas o£ other foreign suppliers who were parties to the Agreement were eliminated; that Cuba -was entitled to a quota~ based

upon historic trade patterns; and that entry duties to compensate
£or the American market premium should not be imposed to reduce
the value o£ the quota to Cuba.
By Article XXI o£ GATT, a contracting party may take any
action which it considers necessary £or the protection o£ its essential
security interests i£, among other circumstances, "taken in time o£
·war or other emergency o£ international relations." Escape £rom the
restrictions o£ GATT 'vould thus require ability to argue either
that a "war'~ or "an emergency o£ international relations" existed.
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An emergency of the type contemplated by the Agreement possibly
could not have been urged convincingly in 1959 or early 1960.
The Cuban-American tariff preferences are expressly excluded
from the general "most favored nation" treatment of customs duties
and charges set forth in Article I of GATT. These preferences were
continued in a separate "Exclusive Agreement" between the United
States and Cuba. 39 Although supplementary to GATT, the Exclusive
Agreement is not a part of it.
The Exclusive Agreement ·was a potential impediment to manipulating the Cuban tariff preference. This was one of the measures
proposed to the Administration. The Agreement contained no
provision for termination other than withdrawal of either Cuba
or the United States from GATT. Under the Protocol of Provisional
Application of GATT, 'vhich re1nains operative, any party to the
Agreement can withdraw by giving 60 days' notice. This satisfies
the requirement of a termination provision in trade agreements made
in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. 40
But unless either Cuba or the United States was prepared to
'vithdra'v from GATT, the only other mode of termination would
be by mutual agree1nent. A United States 'vithdrawal from GATT
would forfeit the tariff and trade privileges which this Agreement confers. This would be a heavy price to pay in order to manipulate the Cuban tariff.
The Exclusive Agreement 'vas not subject to the important
security exception set forth in Article XXI of GATT. Furthermore,
even if the Exclusive Agreement ·was terminated, other agreements
came into operation which contained statements of termination
time and would delay the tariff manipulation.
The Exclusive Agreement suspends operation of the Reciprocity
Convention bet,veen the United States and Cuba of 1902 41 and the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the ~United States and Cuba
of 1934.42
The Reciprocity Convention conferred the 20% tariff preference
upon Cuban products. Article XI of this Convention contains a
termination provision one year after notice by either party.
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934 suspends the Reciprocity
Convention, continues the 20% preference, and provides for termina61 Stat. 3700 (1947).
oro 48 Stat. 943 (1934), Section 2 (b). The trade agreements must be subject to
termination not more than three years after the time the trade agreement comes
into force; and if not then terminated, shall be terminable on not more than
six month:-;' notice.
4133 Stat. 2163 (1903-5).
42 49 Stat. 3559 (1935-6).
39
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tion upon six months' notice. An exchange of letters between the
heads of the United States and Cuban delegations after the Exclusive
Agreement was made clarifies the point that the United States can
terminate either the Reciprocal Trade Agreement or the Reciprocity
Convention while the Exclusive Agreement is in force. 43 But the
time limitations in the earlier agreements still apply.
Thus, pursuant to the exchange of letters, the United States can
give notice of its intention to withdraw from GATT (60 days),
thereby negating the Exclusive Agreement, and notice of its intention to terminate the Reciprocal Agreement and Reciprocity Convention. The time limit of the Reciprocity Convention ( 1 year)
would be the time which must expire before the tariff could be
manipulated.
Threat to American Assets
In addition to the international legal complications which action
pertaining to Cuba potentially invited, approximately a billion
dollars in American assets were at stake. It was amply clear from
enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law and from the preparedness
of the Castro regime to make ad hoc changes in the Cuban Iaws,
that a campaign against American property would commence if
the Cuban sugar quota was reduced or eliminated.
Import restrictions applied by Cuba to American products would
damage exporters of machinery and textiles and producers of
wheat, rice and lard, all of these items having been in heavy demand
in the Cuban market. If the Administration proceeded to "wield
the axe" without the participation of Congress, the reaction from
the economic losses suffered by voters might be reflected in the
alignment of votes in the approaching elections.

Domestic Legal Problems
While the President probably possessed emergency powers to
block imports of Cuban sugar and perhaps take other action, such
po,vers being implied from his authority as Commander in Chief
and from his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, the
scope of these implied powers was not beyond debate. The existing
statutes under which he might act also required findings of fact
which would be difficult to make or required action of a more
precipitate nature than the Administration was prepared to take
unilaterally in view of the approaching election. The latter was
probably the reason for the hesitancy of the Administration in
invoking the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, although
43

61 Stat. 3705 (1947).
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invoking this Act might also lead to action in the Organization
of American States in which the Administration did not appear
ready to proceed.
Pursuant to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,44
the President can terminate a customs preference or end a quota of
"any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist
movement." In early 1960, action under this statute would require
a determination by the President that Cuba was Communist controlled. This determination might be difficult to support in view
of the intelligence apparently available.
Under the Tariff Act the President can impose additional duties
not to exceed 50% ad /valorem of the property concerned or forbid
the importation of property when a foreign country discriminates
in fact by law or administrative regulation against the commerce
of the United States. The President must find the public interest
will be served.45
Although there had been some discrimination against United
States commerce at this time, there had not been a great deal. The
position of the Castro regime concerning United States commerce
had been limited to extravagant threats of action.
Action under either the Trade Agreements Extension Act or the
Tariff Act might support an argument that the United States had
breached a current executive agreement, such as GATT. Determination when the facts were still equivocal of either Communist control of Cuba or discriminations against United States commerce
might damage the moral position of the United States, especially
in the Organization of American States.
Unilateral action by the United States against Cuba might
solidify the impression in Latin America, assiduously cultivated by
Castro, that Cuban-American difficulties were derived from an
effort by the United States to "retain" Cuba in "economic bondage."
Castro could portray his regime as engaged in an heroic struggle
against greater power and odds; mobilize the support of antiUnited States elements throughout Latin America; engage the
sympathy of Latin American governments, which in earlier years
had struggled with the problem of land reform ; and palm off his
difficulties with the United States as an affair in which he was
entitled either to Latin American support or to Latin American
neutrality.
4465 Stat. 72 (1951), Section 5; 19 U.S. Code 1362.
45 46 Stat. 704 (1930); 19 U.S. Code 1338.
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The United States was committed to joint action in Latin America
in economic and security matters, and the Administration understandably took the view that the problems created by Castro were
of such a nature that all American states should assist in solving
them. It was important that a purely bilateral dispute between the
United States and Cuba not be allowed to develop.

Sequence of Events in 1959 and Early 1960
Throughout the first half of 1959 there was justification for the
belief that differences between the United States and Cuba were
amenable to settlen1ent by negotiation. An Agrarian Reform Program was clearly within the general authority of the Cuban government. It seemed equally clear under international law that the
method, time and amount of compensation were inadequate.
The seizure of several Americ-an owned mills in the latter part
of 1959 for sabotage of the 1960 sugar crop (failure to plant or
maintain machinery) was arbitrary and without warrant under
Cuban law, no hearings being given to the owners or receipts being
tendered. These issues were fairly clear-cut, and there was no reason
to suppose that a settlement could not be reached when the emotion
of the revolution had subsided.
During the latter half of 1959, however, the economic and political
ties of Cuba with the Soviet Bloc became increasingly apparent and
the hope of a settlement of claims by negotiation more remote.
Moderate, or potentially anti-Communist, members of the Castro
regime were purged and replaced by officials with a Communist
record or Communist bias. Judges and lawyers fled the country in
large numbers. No move was made by the Castro regime to secure
economic aid from the United States, although aid would have been
forthcoming if requested.
When the Congress met in 1960, the Administration was prepared
to seek standby authority in the President to reduce the sugar quota
of any :foreign country except the Philippines when he found and
proclaimed that a reduction was necessary to protect the national
interest. No cut in the quota by the Congress was sought.
The request was limited instead to a grant of flexible executive
power so the quotas could be manipulated if the need arose. This
would avoid action under the Tariff la-w and the legal complications
that might arise under GATT and the separate Cuban agreements.
The President or Secretary of Agriculture could not vary the
minimum quota as the Sugar Act then stood. Variations in the
quota above this minimum would require changes in the Secretary's
estimates of probable annual consumption. These changes would
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certainly disturb radically the price structure and producer and
consumer interests within the United States.
The request for authority by the Administration, unfortunately,
came too late. Much time was to elapse before Congress could
change the law. Although the President then took action promptly,
the Soviet Union had, in the meantime, launched its economic
sortie, cut away the remaining ground supporting the moderate
opposition to Castro in Cuba, and lashed Cuba securely to the
Bloc economy and political structure.
No amendment to the Sugar Act of 1948 was passed by Congress
until 3 July 1960. Then shortly before the recess of both Houses
for the National Conventions, and after bitter debate, a standby
power different from that requested by the President was granted.
In the interim, tension between Cuba and the United States increased and Cuba succeeded in harvesting and shipping most of its
1960 sugar crop.
Initial caution by Congress seems to have stemmed from the
surge of threats from the Castro regime that the property of
American nationals would be confiscated if the sugar quota was
reduced. The effect of these threats apparently became less as the
policy of the Castro regime became clearer eventually to confiscate this property no matter what was done with the sugar quota.
In the late spring of 1960 the Castro threats appeared to induce
action by Congress rather than instill caution.

Problem of Allocation of the Sugar Deficit
A perplexing problem 'voven in and out of the debates was the
mode of disposition of the sugar deficit if the Cuban quota was
vacated. Just as the Administration proceeded gingerly in its
action against Castro through apprehension of the effect of confiscations of American property upon the forthcoming elections, so
Democratic members of Congress feared the President might reallocate the Cuban sugar quota to influence domestic sugar beet and
cane growers to vote in favor of his party during an election year.
Lobbying was intense by both domestic and foreign producers who
desired a slice of the Cuban share. 46
A long-term problem concerned the possible effect of vacation of
the Cuban quota upon the regulatory system of the Sugar Act of
1948. Administrative practice had been developed to support the
quota system. Prices were controlled indirectly in a manner which
46 An interesting account of the tribulations of both Houses shortly before
the amendment was passed, including a description of the lobbying activities,
appears in New York Times, 4 July 1960, p. 2, col. 1.
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seemed generally satisfactory. The quota system meshed nicely with
acreage controls upon domestic producers imposed under other
statutes.
I£ Cuba no longer furnished a large part o£ the United States
requirements, then the quota system, £or foreign suppliers at least,
made little sense. A major reduction in the Cuban sugar quota
would quite probably require reconsideration o£ the policy underlying the 1948 Act.
The Amendment, as finally passed, extended the Sugar Act until
31 March 1961 and empowered the President to set a new Cuban
sugar quota £or 1960 and £or the first quarter o£ 1961. 47 The
President was authorized to reallocate to domestic producers 160,000
tons which Cuba in turn had been reallocated £rom a deficit by
Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Portions o£ the regular Cuban quota, i£
the quota was reduced, were to be reallocated in stipulated proportions among foreign suppliers.
The Amendment was viewed as a temporary expedient until the
Sugar Act o£ 1948 could be considered by Congress in greater
detail either after the recess £or the National Convention or in the
new session o£ Congress following the Presidential elections.
When it became evident that an amendment would pass before
Congress recessed, passage o£ the amendment having been £or some
time in doubt, Cuban suppliers hastened to load ships under the
existing quota. By the time the Secretary o£ Agriculture suspended
Cuban sugar imports, pending action by the President pursuant to
the Amendment, and despite a prompt increase in ocean shipping
costs, only 740,000 tons o£ the 1960 Cuban quota remained unfilled.
This balance was reduced by the President by 95% on 6 July 1960.4'8
While the Fabian strategy o£ the Castro-Communist regime, with
the other £actors hitherto noted, had contributed to a delay in
Amendment o£ the Sugar Act until the Cuban quota £or 1960 had
been substantially filled, it was virtually certain that the Cuban
quota £or the first quarter o£ 1961 would be eliminated. It was also
generally considered that Congress would extend the power o£ the
President to set the Cuban sugar quota through 1961. Since the

Castro regime ·could not survive indefinitely on the dollars acquired
during 1960 and upon confiscated American assets, its survival
depended upon the speed and freedom with which Soviet Bloc
assistance could be provided.
74 Stat. 330 (1960).
25 Federal Register 6414 (Proc. 3355, 1960). Reduced to 39,752 short tons
raw value plus sugar certified prior to 3 July 1960 but not yet entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption.
-i'f
48
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E. THE SOVIET BLOC "ECONOMIC SORTIE" AND
TERMINATION OF UNILATERAL POLICY BY THE
UNITED STATES

The gap widening between the United States and Cuba in late
1959 and early 1960 provided a convenient entrance for a practiced
and adroitly directed Soviet economic wedge. The groundwork had
been laid during the Batista regime. The major Soviet problem was
one of timing in order to complete the breach and smash Cuban
internal opposition to Castro.
Soviet sugar purchases from Cuba-made for political reasons
since the Soviet Union was then a major sugar producer-commenced
with an order for 500,000 tons in 1954. These orders were reduced
gradually during the Batista regime to a low of 182,148 tons in 1958.
These transactions enabled the Soviets to make contact with the
Cuban sugar industry and officials in the Cuban government with
economic functions even though diplomatic relations between the
Soviet Union and Cuba were not maintained. By 1958, however,
Cuban trade had not been reoriented towards the Soviet Bloc.
After the Castro revolution in 1959, a Soviet order for Cuban
sugar was announced. This was of 170,000 tons at 2.58 cents per
pound. The sale was from holdover sugar owned by the Cuban
Sugar Stabilization Institute. Payment was in dollars and furnished
badly needed foreign exchange to the Castro government. An additional purchase of 330,000 tons was made in October at 2.905 cents
per pound. A total of 500,000 tons was thus purchased during 1959.
The vi~it of Mikoyan and a Soviet Trade Delegation to Cuba
coincided with the beginning of consideration of the Sugar Act of
1948 in the United States Congress. During Mikoyan's visit a cabled
order for 345,000 tons at 2.78 cents per pound was received from
the Soviet Union; and on 13 February 1960, a trade agreement
between Cuba and the Soviet Union was announced. The Soviets
agreed to purchase 5,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar over a period of
five years and to extend Cuba credit to $100,000,000 repayable in
goods or dollars in twelve equal installments at 2V2 % interest.
Of the 5,000,000 tons which the Soviets agreed to purchase,
1,375,000 tons were to be paid for in dollars at the free-market
price prevailing at the time of purchase. The remaining tonnage
was to be paid for in Soviet goods.
The Agreement listed crude and refined petroleum, wheat, metals
and newsprint, caustic soda and unspecified types of machinery as
the articles of Soviet barter. Dollar values of the goods and the
quantities of each to be delivered were not specified, these matters
being left to supplementary bilateral agreements. In addition to her
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sugar, Cuba was to export fruits and juices, vegetables, fibers and
hides to the Soviet Union.
Cuban spokesmen stated the agreement prohibited resale in Cuban
markets o£ the sugar sold to the Soviet Union. This prohibition
would not prevent the Soviets £rom selling their domestic production in Cuban markets and replacing this deficit with Cuban
sugar, nor would it prevent sale o£ sugar by the Soviet Union to
the satellites and resale by the satellites in Cuban markets.
I£ the Soviets followed either o£ these courses, they might be able,
despite the efforts o£ the International Sugar Council, to disturb
the world market, force down its price and destroy the traditional
Cuban markets. This would increase the dependence o£ Cuba upon
markets behind the Iron Curtain.
When the Mikoyan Agreement was announced, Cuban representatives stated they were assured o£ markets £or 700,000 tons in Japan,
200,000 tons in Morocco and 500,000 tons in Red China. The Japanese
and Moroccan markets 'vould be within the free-market quota held
by Cuba. The Red Chinese market was a "new" market and not
subject to the restrictions which the International Sugar Council
might impose.
The publicity received by these manifestations o£ accord between
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc gave new hope to those in the United
States and abroad who desired shares in a reallocated Cuban sugar
quota. Pressure £or a quota cut was increased upon both Congress
and the Administration.
Considering himself adequately supported in view o£ the public
announcements by his Soviet allies, Castro was emboldened to increase his attacks upon the United States and elaborate his threats
to United States property in Cuba. He reinforced his threats by
seizure o£ the Santiago de Cuba Oil Refinery o£ Texaco, Inc., on
29 June 1960 after refusal by its management to refine Soviet
crude oil imported under the Mikoyan Agreement. On 2 July !960,
he seized £or the same reason the remaining two refineries in Cuba,
Esso (Cuba) Inc., a subsidiary o£ Standard Oil Company (New
Jersey) and Shell Petroleum Corporation o£ Cuba, owned by
Canadian Shell Ltd., a subsidiary o£ the Royal Dutch Shell Group.
After Congress passed its amendment to the Sugar Act o£ 1948 on
3 July 1960, and about fourteen hours before the President announced his reduction o£ the Cuban sugar quota, the Cuban Council
o£ Ministers amended the Cuban Constitution to permit nationalization o£ property o£ United States citizens, confiscation o£ property
o£ persons found guilty by special courts o£ antirevolutionary
activities, and confiscation o£ property o£ those who fled the
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country to escape trial and "who are conspiring abroad" against
the regime.
Having anticipated Castro would probably carry his threats
against American property into execution when his Soviet allies
were publicly committed to his support, the United States, as its
first step in multilateral action, submitted on 20 June 1960, a detailed
memorandum to the Inter-American Peace Committee on the Organization o:f American States. This memorandum, entitled "Provocative Acts o:f the Government o:f Cuba Against the United States
Which Have Served to Increase Tension in the Caribbean Area," set
:forth in detail the :facts o:f Cuban-American relations since the
Castro revolution. The Committee was informed that the United
States would continue to provide other information relevant to
the Committee's studies. 49 Submission o:f the Memorandum was a
prelude to presentation o:f the case o:f the United States to a meeting
o:f the Council o:f Foreign Ministers o:f the Organization o:f American
States.
In the interim, Minister :for External Affairs Roa o:f Cuba, on
11 July, charged before the Security Council o:f the United Nations
that the United States had intervened in Cuban internal affairs
and had committed acts o:f economic aggression. 50 The acts o:f
economic aggression cited were "continued threats o:f economic
strangulation," influencing Cuban oil refineries to refuse to process
crude oil owned by the Cuban government (the oil in question
being that imported under the Mikoyan Agreement) and the extraordinary power gran ted the President by Congress which he had
exercised to reduce the sugar quota.
By a :formula devised by the two Latin American members o:f
the Security Council, Ecuador and Argentina, the Cuban complaint was inscribed in the Agenda o:f the Security Council without
objection by the United States. It was understood by Cuba, the
United States and the remaining members o:f the Security Council
that when Cuba had its hearing, the Council would adjourn consideration o:f the dispute pending a report by the Organization o:f
American States. Such a resolution was adopted by the Council

on 18 July 1960. Other countries were urged by the Resolution to
refrain :from action which might increase tension between Cuba and
the United States. 51
Tension was stimulated rather than reduced. During July 1960,
Castro :frantically tightened his economic and political ties with
U.N. Doc., S/4388, 20 June 1960.
oo U.N. Doc., S/4378, 11 July 1960.
51 U.N. Doc., S/4395, 19 July 1960.
49
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the Soviet Bloc. Chairman Khrushchev had been quick to condemn
the cut in the Cuban sugar quota as "aggression"; and the Soviets
agreed to purchase :from Cuba the unfilled part o:£ the United States
quota :for 1960 :for dollars. The price was below the cost of production but :furnished Cuba with needed :foreign exchange.
On 14 July 1960 a Red Chinese trade delegation arrived in Cuba
and contracted :for sugar purchases o:£ 500,000 tons per year for
five years. Twenty percent o:£ the deliveries in the first year were
to be purchased in pounds sterling. Payments :for the remainder of
deliveries during the first year and all payments in subsequent years
were to be in goods.
The Red Chinese sale was in a new market, and consent o:£ the
International Sugar Council to an increase in Cuba's :free-market
quota was not required. The consent o:£ the Council was required
:for that part o:£ the United States quota :for 1960 sold to the Soviet
Union which exceeded the :free-market quota o:£ Cuba. The United
States was not active in opposing the Cuban request for an increase. 52 This inaction probably marks an abandonment o:£ hope
by the Administration that purely unilateral measures by the United
States in reducing or eliminating the sugar quota would affect
significantly either the policies or the stability o:£ the Castro regime.
Not only were Cuban requests :for quota increases usually treated
with deference by the Sugar Council because o:£ Cuba's importance
as a party to the International Sugar Agreement, but any action
by the United States to oppose the quota increase would have been
substantially without support. Only those Latin American states
which had begun to appreciate the danger o:£ Communist direction
o:£ the Castro regime and which had no significant economic stakes
in Cuba would wholeheartedly support the United States position.
Most o:£ these were not parties to the Agreement or had :few votes
in the weighted voting system.
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the allies o:£ the United
States in Western Europe viewed the contest with detached interest
and could appreciate the potential market which Cuba might offer
as its imports :from the United States declined. None o:£ these
countries had reduced their purchases o:£ Cuban sugar and it is
most unlikely that any would have been prepared to alienate
Castro by supporting a United States effort to block a sale o:f
several hundred thousand tons.
From the point o:£ view o:£ the United States, the possible effect
to be obtained upon the Castro regime by :frustrating the sale o:£
the remainder o:£ its 1960 U.S. quota probably was not worth the
52

See New York Times, 20 July 1960, page 7, col. 3.
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diplomatic effort which would have been required to secure the
necessary backing in the Council.
The Council also considered the Cuban request after the United
States had submitted its memorandum of 20 June 1960 to the InterAmerican Peace Committee and the Security Council had made its
Resolution of 18 July. With the United States policy reoriented to
multilateral action in the Organization of American States, unilateral pursuit of Cuba into the Sugar Council would lend credence
to a Cuban argument that the United States rather than Cuba was
the aggressor in the conflict.
Unilateral action was taken by the United States after the Security
Council Resolution of 18 July. But these measures can be considered
little more than an effort to minimize the disruptive influence of
the Castro regime in other Latin American countries by denying
to it a supply of dollars and to preserve the status quo to the extent
possible until the Organization of American States could consider
the dispute.
In a strategic sense, these additional economic measures were
delaying actions in a retreat from an unsuccessful economic defense.
The United States, for example, prohibited the use of International
Cooperation Administration funds to purchase Cuban sugar. 53
Morocco, Iran and South Vietnam had been substantial Cuban
customers. This move tended to shift the trade from dollars to
barter. Morocco, for example, agreed to ship phosphate, sardines,
trucks and other items to Cuba in return for sugar. In October 1960,
the President placed an embargo upon export from the United
States to Cuba pursuant to powers granted by the Export Control
Act of 1949.·54 Excepted from the embargo were unsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies.
The embargo was supported by uncoordinated private action by
creditors of Cuban importers or of the Cuban government. There
being many unpaid Cuban accounts in the United States, sales of
unembargoed items were for cash in advance. Creditors levied upon
a number of items earmarked for export to Cuba, such as lard
and diesel engines. They also blocked export of these items. 55
As the United States took its action supplemental to reduction
of the sugar quota, Castro commen~d his expropriation of American
property in Cuba. The Delicias and Cha parra Mills of American
See New York Times, 20 August 1960, page 1, col. 2.
25 Federal Register 8638 (October 1960).
55 See, Trade with Cuba (Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. Doc. 75553, 1961) 25.
58

54

129
Sugar Company ·were seized on July 20th and the Mercidita Mill
on July 22nd. On August 9th the general confiscation began. By the
summer of 1961, approximately a year later, an estimated ten to
fifteen million dollars out of an original billion dollars in American
assets in Cuba remained in American hands. The reimbursement
promised by the Castro regime \vas to be in fifty year Cuban bonds,
payable from 25% of the receipts from all Cuban sugar sold in the
United States in excess of 3,000,000 tons per year at a price of not
less than 5.4 cents per pound. The expropriations were accompanied
by the imposition of discriminatory licensing requirements upon
United States goods, discriminatory duties, and reallocation of the
United States rice quota to the Soviet Bloc.
While this action by the Castro regime provided a legal basis for
the abrogation of trade treaties with Cuba and an additional basis
for complaint concerning Cuban actions before the Organization
of American States, it also increased the dependence of the Castro
regime upon the Soviet Bloc for markets and for technical assistance in operating expropriated American businesses and industries.
By 1961, approximately 70% of the trade ·with Cuba was with
the Soviet Bloc and the remaining 30% with other European or
American states. The Soviets agreed in September 1960, to purchase all of the sugar which Cuba had formerly sold to the United
States. The International Sugar Council was persuaded to increase
Cuba's free-market quota by 3,000,000 tons to compensate for loss
of the United States market.
By the winter of 1960, the Soviet Union and satellites had commenced their destruction of Cuban markets through dumping.
Quantities of Soviet sugar were offered on the London market
below the prevailing market price. 56 Poland and Czechoslovakia
offered refined sugar on the London market for less than the price
of raw. Similar sales were made in Iraq, CeyIon and the Sudan.
By a trilateral form of dumping, Cuban sugar became a species
of currency for the satellites. A satellite bartered goods for Cuban
sugar and then either bartered the sugar before shipment or sold
it to other Bloc or non-Bloc countries. The shipment was then
directed to the third party. These transactions became institutionalized, so that the satellites have become middlemen, standing between
Cuba and her old markets, and ready to compete in any new markets
Cuba might seek to develop.
Cuba thus was forced into a position in which production costs
had to be lowered by the use of unskilled volunteer labor in cane
See New York Times, 10 March 1961, page 38, col. 3; 10 January 1961, page
69, col. 1.
56
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harvesting to continue to obtain foreign exchange in the free market.
Also, increasingly larger quantities of sugar had to be exported at
increasingly lower prices to attract new markets and offset the
"market-destroying" effect of Soviet Bloc state trading practices.
The Cuban request for an increased free-market quota to permit
this expansion was opposed by the Soviet Union in the International
Sugar Council in December 1961. The Council entered 1962 deadlocked on the issue of quota increases.57
Although Cuba had since announced sugar committed to several
of the satellites will be withheld and sold to customers who furnish
dollars or pounds sterling, 58 she has been swept economically within
the Soviet Bloc. The "free" sugar market and Cuba with it are
firmly within the Soviet economic grip.
F. MACROSEISMIC EFFECTS OF THE QUOTA MANIPULATION

Manipulation of the Cuba sugar quota may or may not have set in
motion a chain of events which will end an effective International
Sugar Agreement. Nevertheless, the new sugar boycott of its
principal foreign supplier clearly confronted the United States
with political and economic problems which overshadowed the
evanescent political considerations which appeared significant during
the 1960 Congressional debates.
By 23 July 1960, the wholesale sugar price in the United States
was $9.70 per hundred pounds. This was the highest price since
1923. The price increase was produced in part by higher shipping
costs upon sugar obtained from sources more remote than Cuba and
by the lack of a 20% tariff differential upon sugar obtained from
these sources. Sugar refineries in the Eastern United States handled
unrefined cane sugar only and could not refine beet sugar obtained
within the United States without equipment modifications.
To reduce the rising sugar price, the Secretary of Agriculture
increased the estimated need in 1960 from 10,000,000 tons to
10,400,000 tons. 61,840 tons of this increase were to be allocated to
quota holders and the remainder was allocated to nonquota holders
in foreign countries. Unutilized sugar beet acreage was reallocated
57 See New York Times, 10 January 1962, page 69, col. 1. The proceedings of
the Council are secret. The Cuban quota for 1961 had been set at 1,992,375 tons.
The Council was prepared to add to this the 3,000,000 tons taken by the United
States before 1959, but Cuba demanded that this increase be of the total
4,860,000 tons committed to the Soviet Bloc, or a total free-market quota of
7,285,000 tons. This would leave the previous 1,992,375 tons to be used in a
search for new markets and convertible foreign exchange.
58 See New York Times, 14 February 1962, page 1, col. 4.
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to states, such as California, in which producers could make late
beet plantings in 1960. In October 1960, domestic restrictions on
sugar beet acreage were lifted. Waste everglades land in Florida
was rapidly developed by Cuban emigres and others for cane
production.
The system of sugar production within the United States was
upset by the emergency. Control of production, importation and
prices under the Sugar Act of 1948 and related laws had been keyed
to the participation of Cuba as a principal foreign supplier. A
reduction or elimination of the Cuban sugar quota thus posed the
problem of a parallel readjustment in the domestic system for controlling sugar production and imports. 59
As the logic of the quota system for sugar supply was brought
into question, the problem was posed for protection of domestic
producers. Their production costs would be higher than those prevailing in the territories of any foreign competitors. Innovations
to protect these producers might have repercussions in the farm
price support program generally.
The Congress could be expected to consider matters such as these
with care and deliberation. While Congress pondered these sensitive
issues, the policy of the Administration concerning the Cuban sugar
deficit and its by-products would have to be developed both indigenously and piecemeal.
The principal problem in foreign affairs which the President was
left to solve concerned the sugar quota of the Dominican Republic.
The Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American
States voted in August 1960 to condemn Dominican acts of aggression against Venezuela, to break diplomatic relations with the
Dominican Republic, and partially to interrupt economic relations
with that country. Trade in arms and implements of war was to be
suspended entirely. Extension of this embargo to other articles was
to be studied by the Council; but no action extending the embargo to
items other than arms and implements of war was undertaken at
this meeting.
Pursuant to the formula prescribed by Congress in its Amendment of July 1960, to the Sugar Act of 1948, the Dominican
Republic was to participate in any reallocation of the Cuban sugar
quota. The Secretary of Agriculture estimated that by reduction
of the Cuban quota, the Dominican Republic would receive a reAt the time of writing (1962), the Administration has prepared a new law
for the control of domestic sugar production and sugar imports which, it is
understood, drops the quota system, although the details of the law have not
been disclosed.
59
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allocation of approximately 322,000 tons over the 34,000 tons which
it would have received prior to July 1960.
Because of the advantageous price on the American market, the
reallocation was a windfall to members of the Trujillo family,
whose members controlled much of the Dominican sugar industry.
The United States was in the position, as many felt, of rewarding
one dictator while imposing a sanction against another. The Government of Venezuela considered the windfall, while not in violation
of the letter of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, not
in accordance with the spirit of that decision.
When Congress reconvened in August, following the National
Conventions, the President, in addition to requesting an extension
of the Sugar Act beyond the deadline of 31 March 1961 with continuing authority to reduce the Cuban quota, also requested authority
to reallocate to other foreign suppliers the 322,000 ton quota which,
by the Amendment of 1960, would pass to the Dominican Republic.
This threat of economic action against the Dominican Republic,
even though its regular quota v.ras not disturbed, proved an obstacle
which prevented Congressional action concerning the sugar quota
during the remainder of the session. The Congress adjourned without extending the Act beyond the deadline of 31 March 1961 established before its recess.
While it then became necessary for the Secretary of Agriculture
to authorize importation of 322,000 tons of Dominican sugar, an
entry fee of 2 cents per pound was imposed upon sugar imported
under this reallocated quota, the fee being payable in advance.
This fee was based upon the provision in the Amendment of 1960,
subjecting a reallocated quota "to such terms and conditions as
* * * the President * * * deems appropriate under the prevailing
circumstances."
The Secretary determined that Dominican sugar in the national
interest should be purchased at less than the United States market
price. 60 The part of the Cuban quota allocated to the Dominican
Republic consequently brought 3.7 cents per pound as against 5.7
cents per pound which the sugar would have brought without the
entry fee. While this price was still .45 cents above the worldmarket price, the entry fee denied approximately $12,900,000 to the
Dominican Republic.
A somewhat different problem was presented by reallocation of the
Cuban quota a1nong other quota and nonquota holders. Quota
countries were quick to solicit increases and 'vere resentful of apparent inequities in reallocations by the Adn1inistration. Nonquota
oo 25 Federal Register 9197 (1960).
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countries, such as India, seeking substantial allocations, could point
with justification to the fact that the supported American price was
a form o£ aid to the foreign supplier.
Reallocation o£ the Cuban sugar quota thus became entangled in
the delicate nuances o£ foreign aid. An award o£ part o£ the Cuban
quota created a vested interest in the recipient. I£ Castro fell, the
Cuban quota might be restored. The tendency o£ the recipient thus
might be to support Castro to insure the breach between the United
States and Cuba continued. I£ the reallocation proved temporary,
the United States would have encouraged the foreign supplier to
increase acreage to meet the new demand. This would leave it with
an unmanageable surplus when the quota was restored. The Soviet
Union, the major sugar producer, could then wreck the internal
economy o£ the overexpanded sugar producer by disturbances o£
the free sugar market.
G. THE DEFENSIVE PHASE OF ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST
CUBA: AN INTERIM JUDGMENT AND DEMONSTRATED
NEED

Sufficient time has not elapsed to permit an adequate appraisal
o£ the economic measures developed by the United States against
Cuba in the "sugar encounter." During 1961 Congress extended
the Sugar Act until 30 June 1962 and authorized the President to
exclude from reallocations any country with which the United
States did not maintain diplomatic relations. Under this authority
the Cuban sugar quota was entirely eliminated. 61
The Punta del Este Conference in 1962 voted to interrupt the
traffic and trade in arms between Cuba and other countries in the
Hemisphere. The Council o£ the Organization o£ American States
was directed to consider the extension o£ this embargo and boycott
to other items, with special attention to those o£ a strategic nature,
although recommendations concerning such matters must now come
from the Council.
A boycott upon shipments o£ goods into the United States of
Cuban origin and goods imposed from or through Cuba was imposed
by the President in February 1962. 62 Action may be taken to have
75 Stat. 40 (1961).
25 Federal Register 1085 ( 1962). Reliance was placed upon Section 620 (a)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 445, which authorizes the President to maintain a total embargo on all trade between Cuba and the United
States. The term "boycott" is used in the text as a more accurate description
of the effect of the President's proclamation, an embargo already existing on
the outflow of trade from the United States to Cuba.
61
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the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group apply
its International List and trade restrictive techniques to Cuba. 63
The effects of these and other measures which may be adopted must
be assessed in the future.
At the present time the most sanguine tentative appraisal of these
measures suggests only that time ·was bought within which Latin
American action might be mobilized to contain the Castro-Communist revolution by accelerating the drift of Cuba into the
Soviet grip. Whether this will work ultimately to the political
advantage or disadvantage of the United States will depend upon
the effectiveness with which the purchased time is utilized.
Economic pressure upon Cuba frustrated for the time being an
extension of the Castro Revolution to other parts of Latin America.
Loss of dollars derived from premium sales of sugar in the United
States created unemployment in Cuba. The embargo of 1960 and
its subsequent extension in 1962 have created serious shortages in
food and hard ware. Although assistance from the Soviet Bloc
might ultimately compensate for these deprivations, the Castro
regime was, in the interim, forced to concentrate its attention upon
internal problems and could devote only a small part of its time
and even less of its resources to exportation of its political, social
and economic doctrines.
Manipulation of the quota created a Cuban emergency. Delay in
the manipulation, coupled with the excitement and surge of patriotism which the quota withdrawal created in Cuba, enabled Castro
to purge his moderate follo,vers without embarrassing explanations
to the Cuban public of the facts behind the ousters. Redirection of
Cuban trade was forced at a time when only the Soviet Bloc had
both the capacity for absorbing it quickly and the political motive
for soliciting actively Cuban requests for markets and economic
assistance.
63 A suggestion of the outline of probable future action may be found in the
testimony of Secretary of State Rusk appearing in Investigation and Study of

the Administration, Operation and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of
1949 and Related Acts, Part II (Hearings Before the Select Committee on Ex-

port Control, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. Doc. 77836, 1962)
606-610 ; 615-620 ; 625 ; 626.

